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Wen-Hsuan Yang

TOWARD THE SEARCH FOR THE PROPER LIABILITY RULE FOR HARMS
RESULTING FROM SOURCES OF RISK: A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE
CHOICE BETWEEN STRICT LIABILITY AND FAULT-BASED REGIME

An important issue in Taiwan today concerns the rising tension between strict
liability and negligence. Article 191-3 of the Civil Code of Taiwan imposes a
fault-based standard of liability on persons conducting dangerous activities. On the
other hand, the majority of scholars believe that to afford greater protection, this rule
should be changed into a strict liability rule.

Traditionally, three arguments make it preferable to impose strict liability under
certain circumstances. First, strict liability induces more safety incentives on the part
of the defendant. Second, fairness requires that one who benefits from conducting
dangerous activities should bear the risk of loss. Finally, the defendant is better able to
spread the loss to the general public. However, based on the analysis of each
justification, this Dissertation finds that all of these arguments fail. Accordingly, this
Dissertation argues that intermediate liability, a variation under negligence principles,
is a proper standard of liability when high risk of harm is involved;—i.e. Article 191-3
is proper in imposing fault-based liability to dangerous activities—for the following
vi

three reasons: 1) intermediate liability provides additional safety incentives by
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant; 2) it conforms to fairness; and 3) it does
not consider tort law as a means of insurance.

vii
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Introduction

A. The Difficult Choice Between Strict Liability and Fault-based Regime
In Taiwanese law today, an important issue concerns the rising tension between
traditional strict liability and negligence.1 The Civil Code of Taiwan,2 mostly derived
from the German Civil Code,3 recognizes Gefährdungshaftung, or “risk liability,” a
broader concept of liability regime than the American doctrine traditionally associated
with abnormally dangerous activities. Significantly, however, the majority of
commentators in Taiwan assume that risk liability and the doctrine of strict liability
are synonyms. 4 Moreover, they argue that strict liability is a “superior rule” to
negligence principles.5 As a result, the tension between strict liability and negligence
arises because it becomes difficult for the legal system to draw a line between the
so-called superior rule and the inferior negligence principles. To solve the issue, this
1

In American common law, the recurrent tension between strict liability and negligence is also
observable. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 645 (9th ed. 2008). For a
definition of traditional strict liability, see Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1121 (1987).
Under this Dissertation’s view, implicit in the traditional strict liability is the concept of “absolute
liability.” See infra 130.
2
Unless otherwise specified, statutes or regulations to which this Dissertation will refer in the
following text are rules of Taiwan. For a full English version of the C IVIL CODE (Taiwan), please refer
to:
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=B0000001.
3
For an introduction to German tort liability, see C. C. VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 73-92 (2nd ed.
2013).
4
Wang Tzejian, Chin Chuan Hsing Wei Fa (Tort Law) 663-64 Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2011.
5
Put simply, most scholars believe that strict liability is a superior rule for resolving legal conflicts and
encouraging safety. See generally: Liu Cheuntang, Pan Jie Min Fa Jai Bian Tung Tze (Case Analysis
on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code) 127-28 Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2001
[hereinafter cited as Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code].
1

Dissertation first argues that risk liability is best understood as a superordinate
concept waiting for the supplement of an applicable doctrine, which arguably should
be “intermediate liability.”6
Under the doctrine of intermediate liability, tort liability is determined by the
following three criteria:


First, once an accident has occurred, there is a rebuttable presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant.



Second, the defendant bears the burden of proof to rebut the inference of
negligence.



Third, some version of contributory negligence is recognized as a defense.

Thus, “intermediate” liability is so-called because it is more rigorous to defendants
than negligence principles, while remaining less rigorous than traditional strict
liability.7
Table 1: The Concept of Risk Liability and Resulting Categories of Tort Liability
in Taiwan
Traditional View

6

Proposed View

The Concept of Risk

Risk Liability =

Risk Liability =

Liability

Strict Liability

Intermediate Liability

See below for Table 1.
See Yang Chiayuan, Chin Chuan Hsing Wei Yu Sun Hai Pei Chang Tse Jen (Tort Liability) 6 Taipei:
Angle Publishing Co., Ltd., 2009.
2
7

1. Intentional Torts
Resulting Categories of
Tort Liability

1. Intentional Torts

2. Negligence / Negligence 2. Negligence / Negligence
Variations

Variations (Risk Liability

3. Risk Liability

Included)

Notes:


Under this Dissertation’s view, intermediate liability does not change its status as
a fault-based liability rule because it only shifts the burden of proof regarding
negligence to the defendant. Hence, the new risk liability, fulfilled by intermediate
liability, is only a variation under negligence principles.



It should be noted that although under the proposed view the concept of risk
liability is fulfilled by the principle of intermediate liability, intermediate liability
refers to broader situations in which the shifting of burden of proof is required by
law, and does not necessarily equate to risk liability. For example, the second
paragraph of Article 184 is an intermediate liability rule traditionally not
associated with the concept of risk liability.

With risk liability fulfilled by the principle of intermediate liability, 8 this
Dissertation further argues that traditional strict liability is untenable and that reforms
must take place of several rules currently governed by this so-called superior
doctrine.9 In this way, the Taiwanese legal system can best accommodate the rising
tension between strict liability and negligence.10

8

See above for Table 1.
The distinction between traditional strict liability and risk liability lies on whether the rule recognizes
some version of contributory negligence defense. Because risk liability recognizes such a defense, it
should, as this Dissertation argues, be reinterpreted as the principle of intermediate liability.
10
See supra 1.
3
9

Finally, this Dissertation not only suggests that current rules governed by strict
liability be changed into rules of intermediate liability but also answers five questions
raised by Taiwanese legal scholarship. These questions include:


What is the scope of Article 191-3 of the Civil Code of Taiwan and how
does it relate to Article 191?11
Because the plain meanings of the two Articles render themselves rules of
intermediate liability to govern certain activities, these rules may possibly
overlap. 12 However, this Dissertation argues that they are
distinguishable.13



What are the defenses to risk liability?14
Since this Dissertation argues in favor of substituting strict liability for
intermediate liability as the operative rule for risk liability,15 defenses
available to negligence, such as comparative negligence and assumption of
risk, are also available to intermediate liability.16

11



Does the legislature need to add limitations on the maximum amount of
compensation or on damages for emotional distress for risk liability?17
This argument traditionally serves to alleviate the defendant’s burden
under strict liability. Arguing that intermediate liability should be the rule
for risk liability, this Dissertation suggests that there is no need to keep
these limitations.



Is a different statute of limitation available to risk liability?18
Since intermediate liability, rather than strict liability, is the primary rule
of risk liability, the applicable statute of limitation under negligence law is
also available to risk liability. 19 Hence, there is no need to adopt a

See Chen Tsungfu, Chin Chuan Hsing Wei Kuei Tse Yuan Tse Yu Sun Hai Pei Chang (Tort Laws
of Liability and of Compensation) 200 Taipei: Angle Publishing Co., Ltd., 2008.
12
Id.
13
See infra 165-166.
14
See supra note 4 at 720.
15
Intermediate liability does not change its status as a fault-based liability rule for accidental harms.
See supra 3 for explanations in Table 1.
16
See infra 192.
17
See supra note 4 at 720-21.
18
Id. at 721.
19
In Taiwan, the applicable statute of limitation for negligence is a two-year limitation, as the first
paragraph of Article 197 of the CIVIL CODE provides that:
The claim for the injury arising from a wrongful act shall be extinguished by prescription, if not
exercised within two years from the date when the injury and the person bound to make
compensation became known to the injured person. The same rule shall be applied if ten years have
4

different statute of limitation. However, liability under the Highway Act,
damages arising out of nuclear disasters, and product-related injuries are
each subject to special treatments.20


What is the role of equitable liability under this Dissertation’s
propositions?21
Even though this Dissertation argues that liability should be determined
in accordance with the fault of the actor,22 it recognizes that special policy
considerations may require the imposition of tort liability irrespective of
fault–an insurer-like liability. Accordingly, under this Dissertation’s
propositions, the German doctrine of equitable liability (or the so-called
Billigkeitshaftung) is the only recognizable strict liability principle. 23
However, such a no-fault doctrine should be absorbed into negligence
principles as a secondary variation only.24

B. Methodology
To finish the tasks, this Dissertation will review statutory regulations, judicial
decisions, law review articles, and other secondary authorities to analyze the principle
of strict liability. Additionally, it will compare cases and scholarly works in Taiwan
with resources in the United States. Since the issues of strict liability have been
discussed more in the United States than in Taiwan—particularly the policy debates
over the feasibility and economic analysis of this principle—further reviews on those
elapsed from the date when the wrongful act was committed.
See infra 194.
21
The principle of equitable liability forces one who has the better financial capacity to compensate
the innocent victims for the injuries even if he is not liable. Although Taiwanese scholars call this
principle equitable liability, it has nothing to do with common law equity. See the second paragraph of
Article 188 of the CIVIL CODE for example.
22
Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 Can. J. Law & Jurisprudence 147,
148 (1988).
23
See infra 52-56 for discussions of equitable liability.
24
See infra 160.
5
20

American resources will provide different insights for analyzing the doctrine of strict
liability. For example, some commentators in the United States have come up with
abundant analysis arguing that strict liability should be abandoned in product cases or
that it is unjustifiable in general.25 This Dissertation borrows the analysis from the
United States, and argues that several strict liability rules in Taiwan should be
changed into intermediate liability rules,

26

including liability for product

manufacturers, 27 liability for transportation providers, 28 liability for mass rapid
transit system operators,29 liability for aircraft owners,30 and liability for nuclear
facility operators.31

C. Chapter Summary
Chapter One articulates the importance of this research and explicates the issue
of the rising tension between strict liability and negligence. Specifically, this

25

See generally: William Powers Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U.
Ill. L .Rev. 639 (1991) [hereinafter cited as A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability]
and Peter M. Gerhart, The Death of Strict Liability, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 245 (2008) [hereinafter cited as
The Death of Strict Liability].
26
See supra 3.
27
Article 7 of the CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW,
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0170001.
28
Article 64 of the HIGHWAY ACT,
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=K0040001.
29
Article 46 of the MASS RAPID TRANSIT ACT,
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=K0120001.
30
Article 89 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT,
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=K0090001.
31
Article 18 of the NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION LAW,
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0160003.
6

Dissertation argues not only that the liability rule matters in terms of economic
efficiency but also that further research into reforms of the liability rule provides
different insights into societal changes and meets the interests of the general public.
During early years, tort law was not concerned with the fault of the wrongdoer until
the close of nineteenth century,32 and in the modern era strict liability revived in
specific fields of law to regulate liability for certain activities.33 Strict liability plays
an important role in the development of modern tort laws by affording greater
protection to the general public. In this regard, analyzing and critiquing strict tort
liability not only allow contemporary legal scholars to examine social development
but also shed some light on future tort reform. Additionally, this chapter distinguishes
the modest difference between risk liability and strict liability and addresses the rising
tension between strict liability and negligence in Taiwanese law. Lastly, this chapter
provides illustrations adapted from recent incidents to show that resolving the issues
of strict liability serves the interests of the general public.
Chapter Two outlines the primary functions of Taiwanese tort law, introduces
Taiwanese negligence principles and their variations, and elaborates the majority’s
rationales for preferring strict liability to negligence as the rule to regulate certain
activities and how strict liability is incorporated in Taiwanese legal system. First, it
32
33

W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §75, at 534-35 (5th ed. 1984).
Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code, supra note 5 at 128.
7

dwells on the rules dealing with damages and punishment, and articulates the
difference between the tort liability and criminal liability to emphasize that tort law
should primarily serve as a catalyst of accident avoidance. In addition, it follows a
historical review of tort liability in Taiwan in order to demonstrate the transition from
negligence to strict liability and, most importantly, it outlines the similarities between
Taiwanese law (which maintains strict liability to regulate certain activities) and
American common law (which initiated a strict products liability revolution during
the 1960s). When Taiwan inherited its legal system from foreign jurisdictions,
negligence had already been the dominant law of liability at the time, and a mature
tort system surrounded by negligence principles had been established. 34 During
recent years strict liability has been applied in several fields of law, such as liability
for nuclear facility operators and products liability.

35

Hence, the historical

development of laws of civil liability in Taiwan represents a transition from
negligence to strict liability. Finally, this chapter re-emphasizes the issue of the rising
tension between strict liability and negligence, suggesting that further research into
the policy considerations of strict liability provides the keystone to solve this issue.

34

When talking about the legislative history of Taiwan, this Dissertation refers to the legislative
history of the Republic of China, which still occupied mainland China at the time when it inherited
legal systems from foreign jurisdictions. However, the political issue between China and Taiwan is
beyond the scope of this Dissertation.
35
See supra note 31 for liability for nuclear facility operators and supra note 27 for Taiwanese strict
products liability.
8

Chapter Three introduces American tort liability and critiques made by American
scholars. To provide in-depth analysis, this part begins with the general structure of
American civil liability and refers to tests for strict liability offered by distinguished
commentators. Following the general review, this chapter turns to scholarly comments
that endorse a retreat from strict liability. For example, commentators in the area of
strict products liability argue that: 1) there is no apparent difference in distinguishing
strict liability from negligence;36 2) the assumptions on which strict liability relies are
faulty and this doctrine should be abandoned, at least in products liability;37 and 3)
strict liability does not evoke higher levels of safety precautions. 38 Finally, this
chapter introduces practical reforms that took place in the modern era, such as the
revitalization of negligence principles in design defect and failure to warn cases.
Chapter Four shows that analysis of American common law is instrumental to
the study of Taiwanese strict liability. Although one may doubt the fitness for
introducing common law analysis, considering Taiwan inherited most of its civil
liability from Germany and other Civil Law countries, this Dissertation argues that

36

Reynold M. Sachs, Negligence or Strict Product Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or
Economics?, 8 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 259 (1978).
37
A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, supra note 25.
38
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 64-65
(1987) in which the authors tested strict liability with the Learned Hand Formula [hereinafter cited as
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW]. For Judge Hand’s test, see United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand test is considered an economic meaning of negligence. See
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 32 (1972) [hereinafter cited as A
Theory of Negligence].
9

Taiwan should not necessarily follow the same reasoning as they do, and that common
law analysis, especially the economic approach of tort law, provides Taiwan with a
different perspective of understanding tort liability. To achieve this goal, this chapter
will do comparative works on tort law, policy justifications for strict liability, and the
difference in the areas of law to which this principle applies.
The second part of this chapter distinguishes the difference among strict liability,
intermediate liability, and res ipsa loquitur. The third part of this chapter introduces
how absolute liability fell and how contributory negligence or comparative negligence
became a valid defense in strict liability actions. Specifically, this Dissertation argues
that because contributory negligence or comparative negligence is a valid defense to
strict liability, replacing strict liability with intermediate liability will not sacrifice the
level of precaution or accident avoidance.
Finally, this chapter responds to the tests for strict liability and argues that strict
liability is hardly justifiable as an independent liability regime. Rather, it is
intermediate liability that satisfies the same test and should be the rule of risk liability.
Chapter Five demonstrates how intermediate liability could replace strict
liability as the rule of risk liability and answers several collateral issues. First, Chapter
Five analyzes the proper standard of liability for Article 191-3. 39 Although the

39

The rule is an intermediate liability rule according to its plain meaning. See infra 22.
10

majority of scholars favor strict tort liability as the rule for people engaging in
dangerous activities, this Dissertation prefers intermediate liability to traditional strict
liability, arguing that there is no need to revise the rule. In addition, this Dissertation
argues that Article 191-3 and Article 191 are distinguishable.40 Thirdly, by proving
that there is no compelling evidence suggesting that strict liability helps improve
safety precaution or accident avoidance, this Dissertation argues that other Taiwanese
strict liability rules also need to be modified to intermediate liability rules.41 Fourthly,
to provide deeper evaluation, this chapter addresses the issue as to the standard for
recovery for pure economic loss under intermediate liability, suggesting that pure
economic loss is not recoverable under this principle.42
Finally, this chapter answers the remaining collateral issues including the
available defenses to risk liability, ceilings on liability, and issues regarding the statute
of limitations.43 Most importantly, by interpreting risk liability as the principle of
intermediate liability, the propositions of this Dissertation not only alleviate the rising
tension between strict liability and negligence, but also establish a new framework of

40

See supra 4.
See supra note 27-31 for examples of these rules.
42
This collateral issue is relevant to my previous research in which I framed the solution as a standard
for recovery for pure economic loss in “unintentional torts” to cover both situations under negligence
and those under strict liability. By rejecting the principle of strict liability in Taiwanese legal system,
my claim may be reframed as a standard for recovery for pure economic loss in “fault-based regime.”
See Yang, Wen-Hsuan, Reconstructing the Taiwanese Rule on Pure Economic Loss: Establishing a
General Standard for Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Unintentional Torts. Master’s thesis,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law (Dec. 2014).
43
See supra 4-5.
11
41

Taiwanese tort liability comprising of only intentional torts, negligence principles, and
negligence variations.44

44

See infra 196 for Chart 1.
12

Chapter One:

The Importance of Liability Rule and the Origin of Its Issue

Synopsis




Legal liability matters in terms of efficiency.
The content of tort law has a close connection with social changes and
development.



Resolving the issue on tort liability helps law practitioners deal with everyday
problems.



Risk liability is a liability regime under Taiwanese law traditionally associated
with strict liability.



The rising tension between strict liability and negligence can be demonstrated in
the debate over Article 191-3 in Taiwan’s Civil Code, leading to the quest to find
the proper liability rule to regulate dangerous activities.



Issue highlighted: Is strict liability a superior rule to negligence?

13

1.1 Liability Rule Matters
Liability rule matters, for one of the primary concerns of tort law has been
whether one whose actions harm another should be required to pay compensation for
the harm done.45 Professor Ronald Coase illustrated the importance of legal liability
in his famous article The Problem of Social Cost46 with an example in which a
cattle-raiser and a farmer who raises crops own neighboring lands in a world of zero
transaction costs.47 When the cattle wander onto the farmer’s land and destroy some
of the crops, the issue arises as to who should bear the loss.48 Assuming the farmer
has the entitlement to be free from crop damage, the cattle-raiser will be liable for the
damage and adopt the strategy that permits the highest level of cattle production at the
lowest costs.49 Conversely, if the cattle-raiser has the entitlement to run his cattle on
the farmer’s land without any liability for the damage to the crops, the farmer will
bear the costs and adopt the lowest-cost solution,50 including not cultivating certain
strips of his land.51 The only difference between these two situations is whether the
farmer will have to absorb the damage costs himself; however, in a world of zero

45

MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (9th ed.
2011).
46
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
47
Id. at 2-5.
48
Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 711, 712 (1983).
49
DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 90-91 (2nd ed. 2011).
50
Id. at 91.
51
See supra note 46 at 4.
14

transaction costs, the ultimate result in either case will always be efficient through
bargaining.52 In other words, in the absence of transaction costs, the parties would
bargain to the efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial placement of
legal liability.53 However, in the real world, the transaction costs are positive and
never zero, and the resources are scarce. 54 Furthermore, tort compensation is
predicated on whether the defendant in a tort action is liable for the plaintiff’s harm.55
Thus, legal liability always matters in terms of efficiency.56
In addition, tort reform has a strong interaction with social changes, and the
discussions of legal liability and of its reform matter in terms of social development
and interest to the general public. During early years, the legal community followed
principles more akin to strict liability, and a tortfeasor was responsible for the
resulting damages, irrespective of fault.57 During the Industrial Revolution at the
close of the nineteenth century, the social belief that industries would thrive if they
were not burdened with all the losses that they caused fostered fault or negligence law,
even though industrialization enhanced the chances of accidents. 58 Legislators
theorized that the imposition of excessive liability might have driven out growing
52
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businesses, detrimentally affecting the economy; 59 thus emerging industries and
enterprises flourished under the protective cover of negligence principles. 60 Fault
concepts coincided not only with the social desire of the Industrial Revolution but
also with the nineteenth century individualism underlying the laissez faire political
philosophy of the time.61 Until the mid-twentieth century, the societal need for the
expansion of tort liability to afford greater protection to the general public enabled
strict liability to revive specific fields of law to govern certain activities.62
Historically, strict liability not only plays an important role in the development of
tort law but also affords greater protection to the general public when societal need of
such protection arises. For this reason, the analysis of tort liability not only inspires
tort reform but also makes sure that tort law keeps up with social changes and
development.
Finally, there are practical merits from resolving the issues of liability rule,
because liability rule deals with the everyday problems that law practitioners
frequently encounter. The world in which we live is one full of risks and harms.63 For
example, mine explosions, workers’ occupational diseases, automobile collisions,
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aviation accidents, waste pollution incidents, oil spills, product-related injuries, and
professional malpractices are all daily accidents governed by tort liability. 64
According to the statistics published by Taiwanese authority in 2008, the total
payments from labor insurance to all occupational accident victims were up to 51
trillion dollars in 2007.65 Those accidents led to astoundingly huge amounts of
monetary damages and the waste of resources.66
On the other hand, the primary function of tort law is to provide each individual
protection against unlawful harm, affording proper remedies to the injured individual
and holding the tortfeasor liable for his tortious conduct.67 In this way, tort law
protects both individual autonomy and individual dignity. 68 The research of tort
liability helps systematically explicate when a person should be held liable and pay
for damages done to victims, making sure that tort law serves its important function as
a mechanism for society to deter future accidents and reduce wastes resulting from
potential accidents. 69 Consequently, tort liability matters, and this Dissertation
contributes enormously to the future development of Taiwanese tort law.
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1.2 Defining Risk Liability and Pinpointing the Issue
As noted in the very beginning of this chapter, liability rule always matters.70
However, among several possible issues of liability rule, this Dissertation focuses on
only one of them: risk liability. Before illustrating the issue, this Dissertation has to
define risk liability and provide the general background to this rule, since risk liability
might be an unfamiliar term in American legal scholarship.

A. The Modest Difference Between Risk Liability and Strict Liability

In Taiwanese law, negligence is the default rule for unintentional torts. 71
However, in certain areas of law, Gefährdungshaftung or “risk liability” is the
operative rule.72 The concept of this liability rule is the product of inheritance from
Germany’s legal system.73 Risk liability, as demonstrated by its name, is a liability
regime which attributes one’s legal responsibility to the source of risk of harm.74 In
other words, the imposition of liability under risk liability is not predicated on whether
a person intentionally or negligently caused injuries to others; rather, the basis of its
attribution lies on the fact that the actor owns, manages, or controls the source of risk.75
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It is when the source of risk results in injuries to others that the person who owns,
manages, or controls the source has to compensate the injured victim because under
these circumstances that person is the one who is better able to control the risk and to
spread the loss, and he is also the one who benefits from conducting risky activities.76
Because risk liability holds a person liable regardless of the person’s fault, it is a
rule traditionally associated with the concept of strict liability or with liability without
fault in the American common law.77 However, although risk liability can be identified
as a rule of strict liability, such conceptualization cannot run backwards. That said,
although risk liability is a liability regime governed by strict liability, not all strict
liability rules are risk liability rules.78 This is because some forms of liability imposed
in negligence seem more like strict liability.79 For example, equitable liability (or
Billigkeitshaftung) is a strict liability rule which holds an employer liable in whole or
in part for damages done by the employee’s negligence within the scope of
employment, even if he exercised due care in supervising the employee’s works,80
but it is not a rule of risk liability as its basis of attribution lies on the ground of
fairness and on the consideration of the parties’ financial conditions rather than on the
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source of the risk.81 In so defining, although the Dissertation will use strict liability to
describe the concept of risk liability in the following context, readers are encouraged
to bear in mind the modest difference between the two concepts.

B. The Issue of Risk Liability: The Rising Tension Between Strict Liability and
Negligence

So far this Dissertation has defined the meaning of risk liability and identified
the difference between risk liability and strict liability. 82 In this section, this
Dissertation raises the issue of the rising tension between strict liability and
negligence within liability rule.
As noted previously, negligence is the default rule for unintentional torts in
Taiwan.83 However, the societal need for the expansion of tort liability to afford
greater protection to the general public enables strict liability to revive in specific
fields of law to govern liability for certain activities during the modern era.84 The
basis of this trend is perhaps predicated on the recognition of negligence principle’s
weakness: negligence’s failure to deal with accidents derived from high risks of
harm.85 Thus several legislative changes have taken place, and many strict liability
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rules have been established, including liability for product manufacturers,86 liability
for transportation providers, 87 liability for mass rapid transit system operators, 88
liability for aircraft owners,89 and liability for nuclear facility operators.90
In 1999, Article 191-3 established general liability rule for dangerous activities;
however, it has evoked serious debates over Taiwanese legal scholarship. The rule
also originated from the recognition of high risks of harm and the need to afford
greater protection to injured victims within modern society.91 In modern society, the
complexity of carrying out businesses or activities makes it more difficult for the
injured to prove the defendant’s negligence, and the demanding requirements of
negligence law become obstacles to the ability of the injured to seek recovery.92 For
example, the process of production becomes more complex with the rise of
mechanization, making it difficult for a victim to prove the negligence of the owner of
the enterprise in an occupational accident.93
In addition to fairness considerations, three other factors justify a special
treatment of liability for dangerous activities:
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1) The operators of dangerous activities are the producers of the sources of risk;
2) Only the operators of dangerous activities control the risks; and
3) Those operators benefit from carrying out dangerous activities.94
Under these considerations, Article 191-3 imposes tort liability on those carrying
out dangerous activities, and the injured who seek recovery under Article 191-3 need
not prove the defendant’s negligence and causation between risk of harm to the
damages:95
[T]he person, who runs a particular business or does other work or activity, shall
be liable for the injury to another if the nature of the work or activity, or the
implement or manner used might damage to another. Except the injury was not
caused by the work or activity, or by the implement or manner used, or he has
exercised reasonable care to prevent the injury.96 [emphasis added]
This rule also is the product of inheritance from a foreign legal system. However,
although most Civil Code rules were inherited from Germany, this rule was
specifically inherited from Italy. Article 2050 in the Italian Civil Code provides that:97
[W]hoever causes injury to another in the performance of an activity dangerous
by its nature or by reason of the instrumentalities employed, is liable for damages,
unless he proves that he has taken all suitable measures to avoid the injury.98
However, the three justifications for this rule are identical bases for risk liability.99 In
Germany, risk liability rules are found in individual areas of law, and there are no
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generalized risk liability rules to govern liability for dangerous activities.100 On the
contrary, Article 2050 in the Italian Civil Code provides a generalized risk liability
rule, but its standard for distinguishing dangerousness and non-dangerousness is
unclear, thereby making the rule useless and hardly applicable.101
Similarly, Article 191-3 in the Civil Code of Taiwan is subject to heavy criticism.
In addition to the criticism that the generalized rule has the same predicament as its
Italian origin in providing the standard for dangerousness, Professor Tzejian Wang
argues that most of the rules in Civil Code of Taiwan were inherited from Germany,
and it is highly questionable whether it is appropriate for Taiwan to adopt an Italian
rule about which Taiwan has little knowledge.102 Significantly, this rule is a risk
liability rule, and it is strict liability rather than negligence that should be the rule for
risk liability because it is strict liability that provides better protection to the injured
victims.103 Although Article 191-3 shifts the plaintiff’s burden of proving negligence
to the defendant and relieves the plaintiff of burden of proving causation, shifting or
relieving the burden of proof does not change the rule’s negligence characteristics.104
By recognizing that negligence fails to deal with high risks of harm, the majority of
scholars propose that Article 191-3 should be interpreted as or changed into a rule of
100
101
102
103
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strict liability.105
The first two questions regarding the definition of dangerousness and the
appropriateness of inheriting Italian law do not concern the liability rule, and are of
secondary importance to this Dissertation. On the other hand, the last question raises
an issue that deserves more scholarly attention: the rising tension between strict
liability and negligence. Put simply, strict liability is widely recognized as a superior
rule to afford greater protection to the victims, but the question remains on how strict
liability works in that way. To answer the question and argue that strict liability is the
proper standard of liability for Article 191-3, the scholarship has to analyze the legal
bases of strict liability so as to find the justifications for this principle’s “superiority.”
In addition, if strict liability is a “superior” rule to negligence in affording greater
protection to the victims, more questions arise: why is strict liability still limited to
small numbers of areas of the law?106 Is it possible to expand strict liability to other
areas of law? More broadly, can strict liability be the default rule for unintentional
torts? As readers will discover later, this Dissertation argues that strict liability is not a
superior rule to negligence and that its revival during the modern era originated from
the underestimation of negligence principles.107 For the present, it is more helpful to
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emphasize the practical merits from solving the issue of strict liability by illustrating
the types of accidents that are currently governed or arguably should be governed by
this so-called superior principle.

1.3 Illustrations
In Taiwan, strict liability governs few areas of law.108 In other words, strict
liability is the operative rule for only a few categories of accident, including
product-related injuries, 109 common-carrier accidents, 110 aviation incidents,111 and
nuclear-facility disasters. 112 In addition to those accidents, this section will also
provide examples of incidents applicable to Article 191-3, since the majority of
scholars argue that Article 191-3 should be a strict liability rule. For the present, it is
enough for readers to know that these accidents will be the materials for later
analysis.113
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A. Product-related Injury

1) Manufacturing Defect
a. Poisonous Milk Case114
On October 18, 2009, Ms. Sung bought from a retailer a can of powdered milk
manufactured by Mead Johnson, and opened it immediately. On October 26, 2009, her
5-month old child consumed the milk, and suffered dropsy and fever for three days.
The mother then discovered some unknown crystals in the powered milk, and sent it
for examination. The examination showed that the powdered milk contained
excessive sodium and melamine, and concluded that the consumption of excessive
sodium and melamine was the cause of the infant’s dropsy, fever, and reduction of
urine in the following days. The physician furthered noted that the consumption
would result in long-term kidney malfunction. Ms. Sung brought a suit against Mead
Johnson on the theory of manufacturing defect.
b. Exploding Bottle Case115
C Company delivered several cases of soda to a restaurant, placing them on the
floor behind the counter where the cases of soda remained for several hours. W is a
waitress in the restaurant, and one day she picked up a case and set it upon a nearby
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ice cream cabinet in front of the refrigerator. She then proceeded to take the bottles
from the case and put them into the refrigerator. However, when she moved the fourth
bottle about 18 inches from the case, it exploded in her hand, causing severe injuries
to her. Testimony from her colleagues revealed that the bottle did not bang either the
case or the anything else when it exploded. W brought suit against C Company,
arguing that the exploded bottle was flawed.
2) Design Defect: Defective Ladder Case116
S worked as a technician for L Company, which provided cable television service
for L district. L Company purchased the extension ladder and hook assembly used
during works. One day, S was assigned a routine repair job that required him to rest
against a cable strand located several feet off the ground. S placed the cable line inside
the U-shaped hooks that extended from the top of the ladder and rested the ladder
against the cable. The base of the ladder was on the ground near a utility pole to
which the overhead cable was attached. S climbed the ladder without securing the
ladder to the pole or any other stationary object, planning to secure himself to the
ladder with his safety belt when he reached the top of the ladder, where he would use
a hand line to attach the ladder to the utility pole. However, after S climbed to the top
of the ladder, his weight shifted while he reached for his safety belt, causing the
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ladder to slide sideways from some distance with S hanging onto the ladder. When the
ladder reached a position near the low point of the line between two utility poles to
which it was attached, one of the hooks came off the line, and the ladder twisted and
came to an abrupt halt, causing S to fall to the ground and suffer serious injuries. S
brought suit against the manufacturer of the ladder arguing that the ladder was
defectively designed.
3) Insufficient Warning: Defective Cleaner Case117
O is a bricklayer foreman. One day, O spotted a fifteen-gallon drum of mortar
cleaner sitting on the ground. To prevent the cleaner drum from freezing to the ground,
he picked it up and moved it to a nearby pallet. When O dropped the drum on the
pallet, the bung closure popped out of the drum, splashing hydrochloric acid based
cleaner into his eyes. O eventually lost sight in one of his eyes. The mortar cleaner
was manufactured and packaged by P. The fifteen-gallon drum into which P packaged
the cleaner was manufactured by D, and the bung closure used in the fifteen-gallon
drum was manufactured by R. However, because O settled with D and R, his only
action is against P, grounded under the theory of failure to warn.
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B. Common-carrier Accident

1) Freight Transportation Case118
T Company imported a machine from the Netherlands. Upon the machine’s
arrival at the airport, T Company hired W Express for delivery. However, at the time
of unloading, an employee-driver of W Express not only failed to recognize that he
parked the truck on a ramp, but also moved it with the back door opening. The
machine slipped out of the truck, and was entirely damaged.
2) Carriage of Passenger Case119
On November 21, 2003, P took the bus operated by S Bus Company heading for
K train station. However, while en route on the Freeway 1, a third party, C, collided
with a vehicle in front of him and lost control of his car. C’s vehicle subsequently
struck the bus on which P was riding, and P suffered severe injuries.
3) Mass Rapid Transit Station Case120
On May 5, 2001, M took an escalator in a MRT station to travel from the
platform to the lobby. At the end of his ride, he stumbled over a metal cover and fell.
Though M felt a subtle headache, he did not go to the hospital. Afterwards, M suffered
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chronic headache; however, he thought he just caught a cold and took pain-killers. On
June 16, 2001, M had a severe headache and was sent to the hospital. He died of
cerebral hemorrhage on July 2, 2001. Further investigation revealed that at the time of
taking the escalator, the decedent turned around to talk to his spouse, thus not noticing
that he was close to the end of the trip and falling backwards when he stumbled.
However, the decedent’s spouse argued that the installment of the escalator was
improper because there were no signs warning against the risk of taking the escalator
and because there was no staff advising elders to take the elevator instead.

C. Aviation Incident

1) C-Air Flight 711 Incident121
C-Air flight 711 took off on the sunny afternoon of May 25, 2002, and was
scheduled to arrive at the H Province Airport within ninety minutes. All on the flight
crew were highly experienced pilots, but about half an hour after taking off,
presumably while the plane was still climbing, the flight was lost. All of the crew
members and passengers onboard died in the accident.
After three hours of searching for flight 711, the Coast Guard located the
wreckage. Further investigation found that twenty years prior to the accident, when
121
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the same aircraft landed at the H Province Airport, its tail struck the ground and
scraped along the runway because the pilot landed it with the nose too high. Even if
C-Air conducted a permanent repair after the incident, the repair was not carried out
properly because the workers did not follow the instructions in the aircraft
manufacturer’s structural repair manual. According to the instructions, any damaged
plate has to be replaced and the new plate must be large enough to cover more than
thirty percent of the damaged area. However, the repair crews failed to replace the
damaged plate; rather, they simply covered the area with a plate the same size as the
damaged area. Because of the improper maintenance, the damaged part of the aircraft
was gradually weakened as a consequence of metal fatigue, and finally broke on the
date of the accident.
2) T-Air Flight 555 Incident122
On the evening of July 23, 2014, T-Air flight 555 took off in the rain, and was
scheduled to arrive at the P City Airport within an hour. On that day, there were heavy
rains at the destination because of an approaching typhoon. While the aircraft was
landing, it deviated from its course and lost altitude. In an effort to land for a second
time, the aircraft crashed into two houses a few seconds later, causing the deaths of 48
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out of 58 people on board and inflicting ground injuries on 5 people. Further
investigation concluded that the aircraft lost control because of extreme weather
conditions.123

D. Nuclear-facility Disaster124

On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred near J Island. A
nuclear power plant on J Island consisted of three units of nuclear reactors. All
reactors were automatically shut down at the time the earthquake was detected.
However, the situation worsened after a tsunami hit the power plant, severely
damaging the power supply facilities and crashing the emergency-cooling system.
Subsequently, fuel rods in the reactors melted, causing several explosions and the
release of radioactive materials.
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E. Dangerous Activities

1) The Gasoline Leaks Case125
C Petroleum Co. is famous for manufacturing and exporting a selection of high
quality gasoline, and owns an oil refinery in K City. On April 24, 1999, an oil tanker
owned by W Inc. was anchored at the pier of the K City refinery, preparing to load the
gasoline ready for export. C Petroleum provided the petroleum pipelines to transmit
the gasoline onto the cabin of the tanker from its gasoline storage facilities. Five
minutes after the transmission, one of the pipelines exploded, and the oil leakage
polluted the marine area around a neighboring pier owned by H.
2) Electricity Overload Case126
On April 13, 2002, a fire occurred at B’s office and consumed a neighboring
house owned by A. Fire investigation revealed that a short circuit was the cause of the
fire, which resulted from long-term usage of electricity at B’s office.
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Chapter Two:

Laws of Tort Liability in Taiwan

Synopsis



Tort law serves to compensate the victim for injuries and to deter future accidents,
not to punish the injurer.



The Civil Code of Taiwan adopts negligence as the default liability rule for
unintentional torts.



Negligence is the breach of duty of care of a good administrator or a reasonable
person.



Legislature provides variations of negligence (i.e. intermediate liability and
equitable liability) to afford greater protections.



Although negligence protects freedom of action and induces efficient level of
care, it is believed to be an inferior option when the risk of harm is high.



Strict liability is the operative rule for several high-risk activities, e.g. liability for
common carriers, liability for nuclear facility operators, liability for civil aviation,
and products liability.



Issue Revisited: What is the proper liability rule for Article 191-3 of the Civil
Code—intermediate liability or strict liability?

34

2.1 Overview
In the first chapter, readers already got general ideas about the importance of
legal liability, the rising tension between strict liability and negligence, and the
practical merits from solving the issue of strict liability. The following two chapters
will introduce the tort liability rules of both Taiwan and the American common law.
The purpose of these two chapters serves to give the readers more ideas about the
similarities and differences on tort liability rules from separate entities, which are
important for later analysis.
In this chapter, this Dissertation focuses on Taiwanese rules, outlining the
purpose of tort liability, the default liability rule for unintentional torts, and the
transition from negligence to strict liability.

2.2 The Primary Purposes of Tort Law
Liability for wrongful acts is addressed either by criminal law or tort law, and
together, criminal law and tort law establish a binary structure to regulate people’s
behaviors.127 Tort law and criminal law share some similarities, since both deal with
acts that injure a third party.128 However, tort law and criminal law serve different
purposes; while tort law covers civil wrongs, concerning itself with harm against a
127
128
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person’s private rights or property as a result of a tortfeasor’s act,129 criminal law
concerns crimes, or wrongs against both the victim and society.130 Significantly, the
primary function of criminal law is to punish the perpetrator for violating public
interests.131 In so doing, criminal law indirectly inhibits crimes and protects society
against criminal offenses.132 Additionally, criminal liability concerns offenses against
society while tort liability cares about the relationship between private parties.133
Thus, in a society where criminal law and tort law separately play their roles, tort law
does not focus on punishment but rather the following purposes.134

A. Protecting Freedom of Action and Private Interests

Tort law serves to balance freedom of action and private interests, focusing on
regulating under what circumstances and for what types of damage the tortfeasor has
to be held liable in order to compensate the injured victim.135
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B. Compensation

Traditionally, compensation or reparation is a main function of tort law. 136
According to Article 184 of the Civil Code—the statutory basis for tort causes of
action in general—a tortfeasor is bound to compensate the injured when liability is
imposed. Specifically, the rule provides that:137
A person who, intentionally or negligently, has wrongfully damaged the rights of
another is bound to compensate him for any injury arising therefrom; the same
rule shall be applied when the injury is done intentionally in a manner against the
rules of morals.
A person, who violates a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others
and therefore prejudice to others, is bound to compensate for the injury, except no
negligence in his act can be proved.
The purpose of the duty to compensate is not to punish the tortfeasor, for
determination of tort liability does not consider the tortfeasor’s motives. 138 In
addition, the amount of compensation under tort liability is irrelevant to the
seriousness of one’s fault.139 Rather, the duty of compensation derives from the
notions of fairness and justice, and the purpose of this duty is to enable the injured to
receive complete and prompt redress.140 Through compensation, the victim can shift
his loss to the tortfeasor who is responsible for the harm.141
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C. Accident Avoidance

Accident avoidance is more important than compensation. 142 As tort law
regulates under what circumstances a tortfeasor is liable for the harm to the victim and
has to pay for the damages, it establishes a norm of behavior which everyone in a
society has to follow; the threat of compensation achieves the goal of deterrence.143
The Supreme Court of Taiwan also emphasizes the role of deterrence in tort law.
For example, in Tai Shang Zi No. 1682 of 2001,144 a man offered a sacrifice to
the god at a fishing port. After the sacrifice, he failed to put out the fire and poured the
flaming remains into the sea. The flames mixed with the floating oil and extended the
fire to a nearby fishing boat, thereby destroying the boat entirely. The court reasoned
that the primary purpose of tort law is to deter future accidents and that anyone who
invites risk has a duty to prevent harm.145 Additionally, in Tai Shang Zi No. 1758 of
2003,146 a fire occurred in the defendant’s house and destroyed a neighboring house
owned by the plaintiff. In reasoning that the defendant has a duty to exercise care in
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maintaining the electric wires, the court reasoned that the purpose of tort law is to
prevent accidents.147

Thus, the primary function of tort law is accident avoidance.148

2.3 Fault-Based Liability—Laws of Negligence
In principle, the imposition of liability requires proof of the defendant’s fault. In
other words, negligence is the default liability rule for unintentional tort in the Civil
Code of Taiwan, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in a lawsuit. The first
paragraph of Article 184 permits two causes of action in tort premised upon harms to
rights or to interests,149 and under this rule the plaintiff has to prove the following
facts.150
A. Unlawful Acts
Acts refers to conscious moves, including omissions. That said, such moves
include situations where the defendant proactively hurts the plaintiff, the defendant
uses another person to hurt the plaintiff, and the defendant is under a duty to act but fails
to do so, harming the plaintiff. In Taiwan, the duty to act derives from legal rules,
contractual relationships, public policies, and morals. Furthermore, since society values
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liberty and individualism, no one could be held liable for the actions of another
person.

151

In addition, to justify the imposition of liability on the tortfeasor, the act should
be unlawful or satisfy the requirement of illegality. In determining whether or not an
example of conduct is unlawful, the court looks to whether the defendant establishes
affirmative defenses such as self-defense, plaintiff’s consent, or permissible risk, each
of which may justify the defendant’s conduct under certain circumstances.152 For
example, a nurse can draw blood from a patient for a test as long as the patient
consents. However, the plaintiff’s consent is subject to limitation from public policy
and morals. That said, a person could not grant permission to another to break his arm
or to kill him.
Similarly, permissible risk asks society to tolerate dangers in conducting certain
activities when those activities are useful and beneficial to the general public. For
instance, a factory is allowed to emit a limited amount of waste gas. However,
although permissible risk makes it lawful for a person to create dangers in conducting
certain activities, the actor still has a duty to exercise reasonable care during the
151

An exception to individualism in tort law is vicarious liability, the responsibility of the superior for
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Article 149 provides that:
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reasonable compensation.”
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course of the activities. In Tai Shang Zi No. 56 of 1997,153 the court reasoned that
permissible risk is an affirmative defense to liability only if the defendant complies
with the regulations of relevant activities and exercises due care in conducting them.
Since the physician in Tai Shang Zi No. 56 of 1997 violated the duty of disclosure
under Article 46 in the Medical Care Act and was presumed negligent, the court
denied the physician’s affirmative defense arguing that the plaintiff’s retroverted
uterus posed permissible risk to the surgery.154
B. Harm to Private Rights or Interests
Actions for harm to private rights are regulated under the first part of the first
paragraph of Article 184, whereas actions for harm to private interests fall under the
second part of the provision. This distinction is practical because whether a victim can
bring a negligence action depends on whether or not the injury constitutes harm to
private rights. Under the first part of the first paragraph of Article 184, only when the
injury is a recognizable harm to private rights can a victim bring an action either in
intentional tort or in negligence.155 However, if the plaintiff suffers harm to private
interests, he is only allowed to bring an intentional tort action.156 In this regard,
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defining private rights and private interests is important for applying the first
paragraph of Article 184. Generally, private rights are those recognized under the
existing legal system, including property rights, publicity rights, and family status
rights;157

private interests, on the other hand, are not recognized under the existing

legal system, but are protected by public policies and morals.158 For example, a
person’s opportunity to make a contract with others is protected by public policies and
morals, thus protected only under the second part of the first paragraph of Article
184.159
C. Damages
As mentioned previously, one of the basic functions of tort law is to compensate
the injured.160 If no one is harmed by the defendant’s acts, there should be no
recovery.161 Tort damages include pecuniary damages and non-pecuniary damages.
For pecuniary damages, Article 216 in Civil Code provides that:
Unless otherwise provided by the act or by the contract, the compensation shall be
limited to the injury actually suffered and the interests which have been lost.
Interests which could have been normally expected are deemed to be the interests
which have been lost, according to the ordinary course of things, the decided
projects, equipment, or other particular circumstances.
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In this way, pecuniary damages include positive harms and passive harms, and both
are measured on the basis of decrease in value. In situations where the exact decrease
in value is hardly ascertained, the court is allowed to exercise discretion in measuring
the amount of recovery on the basis of totality of circumstances. 162 Common
examples for positive harms are losses of property rights or medical expenses, while
passive harms are lost interests that the victim specifically expected to have gained as
the result of the ordinary occurrence. As for non-pecuniary damages, they include lost
intangible interests and pain and sufferings. For instance, Article 194 provides that:
In case of death caused by a wrongful act, the father, mother, sons, daughters and
spouse of the deceased may claim for a reasonable compensation in money even if
such injury is not a purely pecuniary loss.
Finally, it should be noted that recovery for non-pecuniary loss is permitted only if
statutes provide such recovery.163
D. Adequate Causation (Zurechnungszusammenhang)
In a tort action, the relationship between the defendant’s tortious act and the
actual damage has to be established.164 Adequate causation is the common theory for
determining whether liability should be imposed and the extent to which the coverage
of recovery should be. In Tai Shang Zi No. 2210 of 2005,165 the court reasoned that
162
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adequate causation is a two-prong test comprising of a conditional relation test and an
adequacy test. A conditional relation test analyzes whether the accident would not
have occurred but for the defendant’s tortious act. For example, if the defendant did
not punch the plaintiff, the defendant would not have died. By contrast, an adequacy
test relies upon whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the possibility of
the damages under the circumstances. If the answers to the two tests are positive, the
relation is established between the defendant’s tortious act and the actual damages.
E. The Defendant’s Fault
The imposition of liability generally requires proof of defendant’s fault. A person
is not liable for a victim’s injuries unless he intentionally or negligently harmed the
victim. In this way, negligence is the default liability rule for unintentional torts. The
Civil Code does not define negligence, so courts and scholars traditionally refer to the
Criminal Code. Article 14 of the Criminal Code provides that:166
A conduct is committed negligently if the actor fails, although not intentionally, to
exercise his duty of care that he should and could have exercised in the
circumstances.
A conduct is considered to have been committed negligently if the actor is aware
that his conduct would, but firmly believes it will not, accomplish the element of
an offense.

Taiwan in 2005).
166
Article 14 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA at
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=C0000001.
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In this way, negligence is defined as a failure to exercise the duty of care, and the
imposition of liability depends on whether the defendant could have been aware of the
injuries and exercised care to avoid them. However, since criminal law focuses on
punishing the actor’s evil mental attitude, criminal negligence has to inquire into the
deficiency in the state of mind of the individual actor. That is, the individual criminal
defendant is liable only if he could have been aware of the injuries and avoided them.
Tort law, on the other hand, serves different purposes from those of criminal law,
and the test for tort negligence is also different. 167 To achieve the goal of
compensation and accident avoidance, an objective standard for tort negligence is
preferable to a subjective test for criminal negligence.168 That said, although the both
tests for negligence in tort and in criminal actions focus on whether a person exercises
due care to prevent injury, the due care in a tort action should be measured on an
objective standard of care of a good administrator rather than on whether the individual
actor could have foreseen and avoided the harms.169 In Tai Shang Zi No. 703 of
2015,170 Supreme Court of Taiwan supported such distinction. In that case, the court
reasoned that civil liability is different from criminal liability, and whether a defendant
is negligent in a civil case for defamation depends on whether he breached his duty of
167
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care as a good administrator. If the defendant failed to exercise care as a good
administrator in verifying the allegations, harming the plaintiff’s reputation, he might
be held civilly liable for negligence even if he was found not guilty of offenses against
reputation.
F. Legal Capacity
The final requirement of a tort action concerns legal capacity. However, it does
not come directly from Article 184 but rather from the first paragraph of Article 187
in which the rule provides that:
A person of no capacity or limited in capacity to make juridical acts, who has
wrongfully damaged the rights of another, shall be jointly liable with his guardian
for any injury arising therefrom if he is capable of discernment at the time of
committing such an act. If he is incapable of discernment at the time of committing
the act, his guardian alone shall be liable for such injury.
Under this test, whether one has the capacity to make juridical acts depends on
whether the defendant is capable of discernment at the time he acts. If at the time of
accident a defendant has the capacity to understand that he will be held answerable
under law, he satisfies the requirement of legal capacity and is liable for the injuries.
2.4 Variations Under Negligence Principles
According to Article 277 in the Code of Civil Procedure,171 unless otherwise
provided by law or where the circumstances render it manifestly unfair, the burden of
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Article 277 of the TAIWAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, see:
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proof lies on the party who alleges facts in his favor. Under negligence law, it is the
plaintiff who bears the burden of proof in relation to negligence, and liability is
imposed only when the defendant’s fault has been established.172 However, to afford
greater protection to the victims, the legislature is allowed to provide different
variations by either shifting the burden of proof related to negligence or even holding
the defendant liable regardless of fault.
A. Intermediate Liability173
Under the Civil Code, five special provisions are intermediate liability rules. The
common characteristic of these rules is that the defendant can escape liability by
proving that he has exercised reasonable care to prevent injuries.174 However, shifting
the burden of proof in relation to negligence does not change those rules’
characteristics as liabilities for negligence.
Table 2: Intermediate Liability v. Negligence
Intermediate Liability
Types of Liability

172

Negligence

Fault-based

See supra 39.
Unless otherwise annotated, the following text about intermediate liability rules is cited and
modified from Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code, supra note 5 at 79-80
and 97-114. Please refer to it for more details.
174
See supra note 150 at 204.
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The Party Bearing the
Burden of Proof in

Defendant

Plaintiff

Relation to Negligence

1) Statutory Violation
The second paragraph of Article 184 provides a liability rule based on the
presumption of negligence.175 Taiwanese scholarship calls it “intermediate liability,”
for it is more rigorous to defendants than traditional negligence, yet less rigorous than
traditional strict liability.176 Under intermediate liability, a defendant’s liability is not
based on proven fault, but rather on his failure to rebut the presumption of fault.177
For an action under the second paragraph of Article 184, the plaintiff has to not only
prove five out of six elements for an action under the first paragraph of Article 184,178
but he must also prove the defendant’s act of statutory violation. Significantly, two of
these elements call for special attention.
a. Harm to Private Rights or Interests
Although the first part of the first paragraph of Article 184 holds that a victim
can bring an action in negligence only if the injury is a recognizable harm to private
175
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177
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rights,179 the second paragraph of Article 184 dismisses this requirement. In other
words, the second paragraph expands its protection to both private rights and interests
as long as such protections are intended by a statutory provision.180 However, it
should be noted that to impose liability under the second paragraph of Article 184, the
plaintiff must be the class of persons who suffer the class of harms protected by the
statutory provision.181
b. The Meaning of “Statute”
The meaning of “statute” under the second paragraph of Article 184 should
include all statutory regulations, customs, ordinances, and directive rules. 182 A
common example of statutory violation is violation of the Road Traffic Management
and Penalty Act.183 Hence, if the defendant was speeding at the time of the accident,
he was presumed negligent for injuries to bystanders under the second paragraph of
Article 184.
2) Liability for Animals
Article 190 of the Civil Code imposes intermediate liability on the possessor of
an animal if the animal kept by the possessor causes harm to the victim. More
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specifically, it provides that:
If injury is caused by an animal, the possessor is bound to compensate the injured
person for any injury arising therefrom, unless reasonable care in keeping
according to the species and nature of the animal has been exercised, or unless the
injury would have been occasioned notwithstanding the exercise of such
reasonable care.
The possessor may claim for reimbursement against the third party, who has
excited or provoked the animal, or against the possessor of another animal which
has caused the excitement or provocation.
Within this rule, “reasonable care” is in the defendant’s favor, and according to Article
277 of the Code of Civil Procedure he bears the burden of proof in relation to
negligence.184 Because the possessor is presumptively negligent, Article 190 is a rule
of intermediate liability. To escape liability, the defendant has to prove that he has
exercised reasonable care in keeping the animal or the injury would have occurred
irrespective of the exercise of reasonable care.185
3) Liability for Work Pieces
Article 191 of the Civil Code imposes intermediate liability on the person who
privately owns a building or work piece when a victim is injured by the building or
work piece. Specifically, the rule provides that:
The injury, which is caused by a building or other work on privately owned land,
shall be compensated by the owner of such building or work, unless there is no
defective construction or insufficient maintenance in such building or work, or the
injury was not caused by the defectiveness or insufficiency, or the owner has
exercised reasonable care to prevent such injury.
184
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In the case of the preceding paragraph, if there is another person who shall be
responsible for the injury, the owner making compensation may make a claim for
reimbursement against such person.
According to this rule, the defendant can prove facts in his favor to escape liability,
including 1) there is no defective construction or insufficient maintenance in the
building or work piece; 2) the injury was not caused by the defectiveness or
insufficiency; or 3) the owner has exercised reasonable care to prevent such injury.
The second defense is about the causal link, 186 whereas the first and the third
defenses are rebuttals to liability. Because it is the defendant that bears the burden of
proof to rebut negligence, Article 191 is an intermediate liability rule.
4) Liability for Products
Article 191-1 of the Civil Code imposes intermediate liability on the product
manufacturer and importer if the victim suffers injuries arising out of the ordinary use
or consumption of the merchandise by providing that:
The manufacturer is liable for the injury to another arising from the common use
or consumption of his merchandise, unless there is no defectiveness in the
production, manufacture, process, or design of the merchandise, or the injury is
not caused by the defectiveness, or the manufacturer has exercised reasonable care
to prevent the injury.187
The manufacturer mentioned in the preceding paragraph is the person who
produces, manufactures, or processes the merchandise. Those, who attach the
merchandise with the service mark, or other characters, signs to the extent enough
to show it was produced, manufactured, or processed by them, shall be deemed to
be the manufacturer.
186
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If the production, manufacture, process, or design of the merchandise is
inconsistent with the contents of its manual or advertisement, it is deemed to be
defective.
The importer shall be as liable for the injury as the manufacturer.
This rule was amended in 1999. The first paragraph of Article 191-1 establishes the
liability rule for the product manufacturer. Under this rule, the defendant bears the
burden of proof in relation to negligence and causation, and Article 191-1 is an
intermediate liability rule.188
5) Liability for Motor Vehicles
Article 191-2 is the liability rule for a driver of a motor vehicle if the driver
causes injuries to another. Specifically, it imposes intermediate liability on the driver
by providing that:
If an automobile, motorcycle or other motor vehicles which need not to be driven
on tracks in use has caused the injury to another, the driver shall be liable for the
injury arising therefrom, unless he has exercised reasonable care to prevent the
injury.
Under this rule, the defendant bears the burden of proof in relation to negligence.
Hence, this rule also is an intermediate liability rule.
B. Equitable Liability (Billigkeitshaftung)189
The principle of equitable liability, a second variation under negligence
principles inherited from the German legal system, forces one who has the better
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financial capacity to compensate the innocent victims for the injuries even if he is not
liable.190 Although liability under this principle is imposed regardless of fault, its
justification is different from that of traditional strict liability. 191 Rather, this principle
is justified solely on the fairness ground, and is sometimes called “richerse oblige” or
“liability of the rich.”192 Finally, although Taiwanese scholars call this principle
“equitable liability,” it has nothing to do with common law equity.193

Table 3: Equitable Liability v. Negligence

Types of Liability

Equitable Liability

Negligence

No-fault

Fault-based

None

Plaintiff

The Party Bearing the
Burden of Proof in
Relation to Negligence

1) Guardian’s Liability
The first equitable liability rule is incorporated within Article 187 of the Civil
Code, which sets up a guardian’s tort liability in situations where a minor wrongfully
190
191
192
193
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damages the rights of another. Specifically, the rule states that:
A person of no capacity or limited in capacity to make juridical acts, who has
wrongfully damaged the rights of another, shall be jointly liable with his guardian
for any injury arising therefrom if he is capable of discernment at the time of
committing such an act. If he is incapable of discernment at the time of committing
the act, his guardian alone shall be liable for such injury.
In the case of the preceding paragraph, the guardian is not liable if there is no
negligence in his duty of supervision, or if the injury would have been occasioned
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable supervision.
If compensation cannot be obtained according to the provisions of the preceding
two paragraphs, the court may, on the application of the injured person, take the
financial conditions among the tortfeasors, the guardian and the injured person
into consideration, and order the tortfeasors or his guardian to compensate for a
part or the whole of the injury.
The provision of the preceding paragraph shall apply mutatis mutandis to cases
where the injury has been caused to a third party by a person other than those
specified in the first paragraph in a condition of unconsciousness or of mental
disorder.
The second paragraph of Article 187 allows the guardian to escape liability by
proving that he was not negligent in his duty of supervision or that the injury would
have occurred even if he had exercised reasonable care in supervision. Under Article
277 of the Code of Civil Procedure,194 the burden of proof in relation to negligence
and causation lies on the guardian, because under Article 187, those facts are in the
plaintiff’s favor. Therefore, the guardian’s liability is intermediate liability.195
However, a person of no capacity or limited in capacity to make juridical acts is
usually an infant, at least below the age of 20, 196 as Article 13 of the Civil Code
194
195
196
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provides that:
The minor, who has not reached their seventh year of age, has no capacity to make
juridical acts.
The minor, who is over seven years of age, has a limited capacity to make juridical
acts.
The married minor has the capacity to make juridical acts.
Because an infant typically has limited financial capacity, the third paragraph plays a
special role in affording greater protection to a victim by holding a guardian liable
who could have escaped liability under the second paragraph.197 Additionally, the
court is permitted to take the guardian’s financial conditions into account in
determining the amount of compensation. Liability under the third paragraph is
imposed regardless of fault, and the purpose of equitable liability is to achieve the
goal of distributive justice by holding the one who has the better financial capacity
responsible for compensating the innocent victim.198
2) Employer’s Liability
Article 188 of the Civil Code, within which a second equitable liability rule is
incorporated, establishes the liability of an employer when the employee wrongfully
damages the rights of another:
The employer shall be jointly liable to make compensation for any injury which
the employee has wrongfully caused to the rights of another in the performance of
his duties. However, the employer is not liable for the injury if he has exercised
of age.
197
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198
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reasonable care in the selection of the employee, and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties, or if the injury would have been occasioned
notwithstanding the exercise of such reasonable care.
If compensation cannot be obtained according to the provision of the preceding
paragraph, the court may, on the application of the injured person, take the
financial conditions of the employer and the injured person into consideration, and
order the employer to compensate for a part or the whole of the injury.
The employer who has made compensation as specified in the preceding
paragraph may claim for reimbursement against the employee committed the
wrongful act.
The first paragraph renders Article 188 a rule of intermediate liability, since the
employer is permitted to escape liability if he establishes that he has exercised
reasonable care or if it can be demonstrated that the injury would have occurred
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable care. However, the second paragraph holds
an employer liable who could have escaped liability under the first paragraph. Hence,
Article 188 also is an equitable liability rule.
2.5 Risk Liability
As noted previously, negligence is the default liability rule for unintentional
torts.199 However, to afford greater protections, the legislature provides risk liability
or strict liability rules in certain areas of law.200
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A. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Negligence201
Negligence protects freedom of action, so that a person need not worry about
excessive liability. For example, if liability is imposed regardless of fault, a person
with a strong sense of responsibility will have little incentive to carry out activities,
thus impeding social development. On the contrary, a person with little sense of
responsibility will indulge himself, thus bringing about more accidents. In this way,
negligence induces an efficient level of care to protect individual rights, for liability
will be imposed only if the burden of taking precaution is less than the product of the
magnitude of accident loss and the probability of the accident.202
However,

with

negligence

fostering Industrial

Revolution

and

social

development, the risk of harm becomes far greater for conducting certain activities in
a modern society. The costs of preventing those high-risk accidents might be too high,
and the defendant could avoid his liability under negligence. Moreover, upmost care
accompanied with the best technology at hand might fail to prevent certain high-risk
accidents. Secondly, the complexity of carrying out businesses or activities in a
modernized society sometimes makes it more difficult for an innocent victim to prove
a tortfeasor’s negligence, and the demanding requirements of negligence law become
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obstacles to the victim’s ability to seek recovery. 203 With the above reasons,
negligence is believed to be an inferior option when the risks of harm are high and
when the victim encounters hardship in burden of proof,204 and strict liability meets
the societal need in affording greater protection.
B. Rise of Strict Liability205
In Taiwan, strict liability is the governing rule for several high-risk activities,
including liability for common carriers, liability for nuclear facility operators, liability
for civil aviation, and liability for products.206
1) Liability for Aviation Incident
In 1953, the Civil Aviation Act introduced the first strict liability rule in Taiwan
to regulate damages arising out of aviation incidents. According to Article 89 of the
Civil Aviation Act:207
Where casualties or damage to property occur as a result of aircraft accident, the
owner of the aircraft shall be liable for compensation regardless of whether such
accident is due to willful action or negligence. Such an owner of the aircraft shall
also be liable for damage caused by force majeure. The same also applies to
damage caused by falling or dropping of objects from the aircraft.
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Moreover, Article 91 in the same Act regulates the liability of an aircraft operator
when the passenger incurs harm in the aircraft or while embarking or disembarking
the aircraft, as well as the aircraft operator’s liability for delay. Specifically, the rule
provides that:208
The aircraft operator shall be liable for accidental death or injury of passengers in
the aircraft or while embarking or disembarking the aircraft. But if such death or
injury is attributed to the passenger’s fault, such liability may be exonerated or
reduced.
The aircraft operator shall be liable for causing damage to passengers because of
flight delay, provided that the aircraft operator can prove the delay is caused by
force majeure. The liability shall be limited to the necessary extra expense
incurred to the passengers through the flight delay.
Liability under Article 89 is “absolute liability,” for the owner of the aircraft is liable
not only regardless of fault but also for the damage caused by unexpected and
uncontrollable events. As for Article 91, it is a strict liability rule. However, there is a
ceiling on the liability under Article 91, since Article 3 in Regulations of
Compensation for Damage Caused to Air Passengers and Freight provides that:
The aircraft operator or consignor, as held liable to each and every passenger for
damage under the first paragraph of article 91 of This Act,209 shall adhere to the
standards below for making compensation. Nevertheless, if the victim can prove
damage was much greater, he or she may request compensation beyond the set
amount：
1) Death: NT$3,000,000.
2) Severe injury: NT$1,500,000.
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If damage did not cause death or severe injury, compensation shall be
commensurate with actual harms done, but not exceeding NT$1,500,000 at the
highest.
The so-called severs injury conforms in meaning to Item 4, Article 10 of the
Criminal Code.
The ceiling on the liability will disappear if the damage to the passenger or freight
resulted from willful or major neglect or wrongdoing on the part of the aircraft operator,
consignor, or their employee or representative in the execution of duties.210
Furthermore, the Civil Aviation Act does not preempt the plaintiff’s tort cause of
action under the Civil Code, and an aircraft owner or consignor will be liable for full
compensation if the plaintiff pursues his cause of action under Article 184 of the Civil
Code. However, if the damage results from the intentional act or negligence of a crew
or a third party, the owner, lessee or borrower of the aircraft has another cause of action
against such crew or third party. 211 Finally, aircraft owners and civil air transport
enterprises are mandated to purchase liability insurance.212
2) Liability for Nuclear Disaster
Article 18 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law imposes strict liability on
the operator of a nuclear facility in cases of nuclear accidents by providing that:
The operator of a nuclear installation shall, in accordance with this Law, be liable
for nuclear damages arising from the occurrence or expansion of a nuclear
incident regardless of whether it is caused intentionally or through negligence,
210
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except when the nuclear incident is caused directly by international armed
conflicts, hostilities, domestic rebellion, or grave natural calamity.
Liability under this rule is strict liability. However, the operator is not an insurer to a
nuclear disaster, and is permitted to escape liability by proving that the nuclear
incident is caused directly by international armed conflicts, hostilities, domestic
rebellion, or grave natural calamity. Moreover, comparative negligence is a valid
defense.213 Third, Article 24 of this Law provides a ceiling on the liability, and the
liability of a nuclear installation operator for nuclear damages arising out of each single
nuclear incident is limited to NTD 4,200,000,000, not including interest and costs of
litigation.214 Fourth, a nuclear installation operator is mandated to maintain liability
insurance or financial guarantee unless the operator is the Central Government,
provincial or municipal government or their research organizations.215 Finally, special
statutes of limitation are applicable to causes of action arising under this Law:
a. Article 28 of this Law provides that:
Claims of compensation for nuclear damage shall be extinguished if an action is
not brought within three (3) years after knowledge of the damage and of the
nuclear installation operator liable for the damage; however the period shall in no
case exceed ten (10) years from the date of the nuclear incident.
b. Article 29 of this Law provides that:
Where the nuclear material causing a nuclear incident is stolen, lost, jettisoned or
abandoned, the statute of limitations of the right to claim compensation shall be
governed by the preceding Article. However, when making a claim for
213
214
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compensation against the original nuclear installation operator of the said nuclear
material, the claim shall be made within twenty (20) years from the time the
nuclear material is stolen, lost, jettisoned or abandoned.
3) Liability for MRT Accident
According to the first paragraph of Article 46 of the Mass Rapid Transit Act,216
the operation organization of a mass rapid transit system is strictly liable for personal
death or injury of passengers and for damage or loss caused by trains or other rail
accidents such as derailments.217 Similarly, the operator is mandated to maintain
liability insurance.218
4) Liability for Common Carrier
Article 64 of the Highway Act holds a transportation provider strictly liable for
traffic accidents by providing that:219
In the case of traffic accidents causing injury or death to passengers or other
people, or damage or loss to money or property, automobile or trolley
transportation providers shall be liable for the damage and compensate for it.
However, the providers are not liable to pay damage compensation if it can be
proven that the accident was due to force majeure or fault of the shipper or
recipient of carried goods.
Damage compensation of damaged or lost goods under this article shall [equal] up
to NTD 3000 per piece unless the shipper has declared and stated clearly about the
quality and value of the goods, on the carry agreement before shipping.
The rule of damage compensation applicable to the injury or death of passengers
or other people will be separately determined by the MOTC.
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This rule was amended in 2000. Under the first paragraph of the rule, automobile or
trolley transportation providers are strictly liable for the damage to passengers or
other people. However, if the accident resulted from an act of God, the transportation
providers might escape liability. In addition, the second paragraph provides a ceiling
on the liability for damaged or lost goods, and the third paragraph refers to a rule
separately determined by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
regarding the ceiling on the liability for harms to persons or properties.220 Finally,
Article 65 in the same Act requires the transportation providers to purchase liability
insurance by stating that:221
Automobile owners should have liability insurance under this article.
Trolley owners should have liability insurance before applying to highway
authorities for the issuance of license plates, under rates provided by the MOTC.
Insurance premiums are set by the MOTC. Automobile or trolley transportation
providers should have liability insurance for passengers, and the minimum
insurance coverage set by the MOTC may be exempted from the liability
insurance under this article.
Transportation providers that fail to pay insurance premiums shall be fined at least
NTD 100,000 but not more than NTD 500,000.
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5) Liability for Products
Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law is a special provision governing the
liabilities for a manufacturer of commercial product and for a service provider. The
rule imposes strict liability by providing that:222
Business operators engaging in the design, production or manufacture of goods or
in the provisions of services shall ensure that goods and services provided by them
meet and comply with the contemporary technical and professional standards of
the reasonably expected safety prior to the sold goods launched into the market, or
at the time of rendering services.
Where goods or services may endanger the lives, bodies, health or properties of
consumers, a warning and the methods for emergency handling of such danger
shall be labeled at a conspicuous place.
Business operators violating the two foregoing two paragraphs and thus causing
injury to consumers or third parties shall be jointly and severally liable therefor,
provided that if business operators can prove that they are not guilty of negligence,
the court may reduce their liability for damages.
In contrast to the products liability provision under the Civil Code,223 Article 7 of the
Consumer Protection Law holds a manufacturer strictly liable for damages caused by
product defects. Together they establish a dual system to regulate product-related
accidents, and both premise liability upon the defect of the product.224 However,
some distinctions are worth mentioning.
First, although both Article 191-1 of the Civil Code and Article 7 of the
Consumer Protection Law regulate liability for product-related injuries, the former
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rule imposes intermediate liability on product manufacturers, whereas the latter one
holds product manufacturers strictly liable. This could be demonstrated by the third
paragraph of Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law, for the court may reduce
rather than exempt the manufacturer’s liability when the manufacturer proves that he
was not negligent.225 As for liability for retailers, the first paragraph of Article 8 of
the Consumer Protection Law imposes intermediate liability on them because they
may escape liability if they have exercised due care to prevent the injury or if the injury
would still have occurred even though they had exercised due care.226 On the other
hand, since Article 191-1 of the Civil Code does not extend to the liability for retailers,
intermediate liability does not apply and the plaintiff bears the burden of proof related
to negligence in an action brought under the Civil Code.227
Second, Article 191-1 of the Civil Code protects “everyone” from harm caused by
a defective product. On the other hand, Article 7 in Consumer Protection Law protects
“consumers and third persons” only.228 According to the first provision of Article 2 of
this Law, the term “consumers” means those who enter into transactions, use goods, or
accept services for the purpose of consumption.229 “Consumers” under Article 7 of this
Law are those not intending to use the products for manufacturing or resale but are
225
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rather “end users.”230 As for “third parties” under Article 7 of this Law, they are limited
to foreseeable victims injured in the course of an end user’s consuming behaviors. For
example, a pedestrian injured in a car accident resulting from tire blow may bring an
action under Article 7 of this Law against the tire manufacturer.231 The linchpin of an
action under Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law is whether an end user’s
“consuming behaviors” causes harm.
Third, while Article 191-1 of the Civil Code does not regulate liability for service
providers, Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law imposes strict liability on them if
harm to consumers or third parties is adequately attributed to defective services.
However, medical services are excluded from this rule.232 Finally, punitive damages
are not available in a product-related action under the Civil Code, whereas they are
available under the Consumer Protection Law because Article 51 of this Law provides
that:
In a litigation brought in accordance with this law, the required consumer may
claim for punitive damages up to 3 times the amount of actual damages as a result
of injuries caused by the willful act of misconduct of business operators; however,
if such injuries are caused by negligence, a punitive damage up to one time the
amount of the actual damages may be claimed.
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However, since the primary function of tort law is accident avoidance, the availability
of punitive damages in a products liability action is subject to criticisms.233
Table 4: Manufacturer Liability Under Civil Code v. Manufacturer Liability
Under Consumer Protection Law234
Manufacturer Liability
Manufacturer Liability
Under Consumer
Under Civil Code
Protection Law
Liability Rule

Intermediate Liability

Strict Liability
Consumers and Third

Parties Protected

Everyone
Parties

Liability for Defective
Not Available

Available

Not Available

Available

Services
Punitive Damages

C. Issue Revisited: The Rising Tension Between Strict Liability and
Negligence—Article 191-3 of the Civil Code
With the introduction about Taiwanese strict liability rules, readers may discover
that while negligence is still the default liability rule for unintentional torts, strict

233
234

See supra note 7 at 10.
See supra note 150 at 263 for a more detailed comparison.
67

liability becomes the operative rule for certain activities.235 In Taiwan, the expansion
of tort liability represents a transition from negligence to strict liability. In situations
where the risks of harm are high and when the victim encounters hardship in bearing
the burden of proof, strict liability is considered to be preferable to negligence. 236 It
stands to reason that the proper liability rule for dangerous activities should be strict
liability. 237 However, Article 191-3 of the Civil Code contradicts this logic and
imposes intermediate liability on persons conducting dangerous activities.238 This
logical discrepancy raises scholarly debates and draws attention to the tension
between strict liability and negligence. To solve the issue and choose the proper
liability rule for Article 191-3, this Dissertation needs to analyze whether and under
what circumstances strict liability is a superior option.
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Chapter Three:

Laws of Tort Liability in the American Common Law

Synopsis



In the American common law, negligence also is the default liability rule for
unintentional torts.




Negligence is breach of duty of care of a reasonable person.
In the American common law, strict liability applies to animals, abnormally
dangerous activities, and products.



American commentators not only provide in-depth analysis on whether and under
what circumstances strict liability is a superior option but also challenge the policy
justifications for strict liability theory.
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3.1 Overview
As mentioned in Chapter One, the early common law followed principles more
akin to strict liability, and “fault-based” liability marked the legal progress of the late
nineteenth century by benefiting the emerging industry of that time.239 After the
1960’s, the American products liability revolution revitalized strict liability and
initiated the modern expansion of liability without fault.240 Hence, laws of liability in
the American common law and the scholarly analysis of strict liability are
instrumental for this Dissertation to find whether and under what circumstances strict
liability is a superior option.
3.2 Negligence

A. General Principle

In the United States, negligence also is the default liability rule for unintentional
torts. Take automobile accidents for instance: in Hammontree v. Jenner,241 while
driving home from work, the defendant suffered an epileptic seizure and became
unconscious, thereby crashing through the plaintiffs’ bicycle shop and hurting the
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plaintiffs.242 Plaintiffs Hammontree and her husband sued the defendant for personal
injuries and property damages arising out of the automobile accident.243 In refusing to
hold the defendant liable for the accident, the court reasoned that the liability of a
driver in an automobile accident rests on principles of negligence.244
In general, the burden of proof in an action for negligence lies with the plaintiff
unless circumstances suggest that the court alleviate such burden.245 In Brown v.
Kendall, the defendant raised his stick to interfere with the fighting between his dog
and the plaintiff’s but accidently struck and injured the plaintiff. 246 The court
reasoned that if the act of hitting the plaintiff was unintentional on the part of the
defendant, and done while performing a lawful act, then the defendant was not liable
unless it was done in the want of exercise of due care adapted to the exigency of the
case, and therefore such want of due care became part of the plaintiff's case, and the
burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish it.247 Thus, in an action for negligence,
the plaintiff has to prove the following facts: breach of duty, causal connection, and
damages.248
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1) Duty: Standard of Care
All people in society owe a duty to refrain from conduct that creates
unreasonable risk of harm.249 A person must act as an ordinarily careful person or a
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. 250 As stated by Professor
William Prosser:251
In negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard
of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk. What the defendant must do, or
must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty.
For instance, an ordinary individual knows that when a tire is worn through to the
fabric, its further use is dangerous and it should be removed.252
However, no one has any duty to guard against unforeseeable or extraordinary
peril. In Adams v. Bullock, a 12-year-old child swung an 8-feet-long wire while
crossing a bridge, and his wire came into contact with a nearby overhead wire used by
the defendant for its trolley system.253 The child was shocked and burned.254 The
court reasoned that ordinary caution did not involve forethought of this extraordinary
peril and refused to hold the defendant liable.255 Additionally, although no one has any
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duty to act or help under general circumstances, a person has a duty to avoid any
affirmative actions which may make a situation worse.256 If the defendant does attempt
to aid a person, and takes charge and control of the situation, he is regarded as entering
voluntarily into a relation which is attended with responsibility.257 Such a defendant
will then be liable for a failure to use reasonable care for the protection of the plaintiff's
interests.258
As for means to establish the required standard of care, although expert
testimony is not required in a usual case, it is generally necessary when the case comes
to that of professional malpractice. Specifically, to establish the duty of care owed by
the professional, the plaintiff has to offer expert testimony unless the alleged negligence
is so obviously shown that the trier of fact could recognize it without expert
testimony.259 Such expert testimony is necessary to establish the relevant standard for
the trier of fact because professional standards are often beyond the knowledge of the
average person.260
Another way to delineate the standard of care of a professional is to apply the
locality rule. For example, in an accountant malpractice case the plaintiff has to
establish the standard of care of the accountant. This may include the general
256
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expectation that the accountant will render his services with certain degree of skill, care,
knowledge, and judgment usually possessed and exercised by members of the
profession in the particular locality.261 Accordingly, in a professional malpractice case,
the “locality rule” requires the professional to act with ordinary and reasonable care in
accordance with the customs or practices of professionals from a particular geographic
region. Such standard can be the same community standard,262 a regional standard263
or a national standard,264 depending on what law the state court applies.265

2) Breach of Duty

A plaintiff in a negligence action must establish breach of duty. Often a duty is
based on the reasonable person standard.266 The test for breach of duty is whether the
defendant failed to do what a reasonable person would do under similar circumstances.
In United States v. Carroll Towing,267 a barge, without a bargee on board, broke adrift
and crashed through a tanker.268 The tanker’s propeller broke a hole in the barge, and
the barge sank, with its cargo lost. 269 In holding the barge’s owner liable under
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negligence, the court reasoned that it was reasonable to expect the barge owner to have
had a bargee on board to prevent the risk of the barge breaking adrift from the moorings
under the circumstances of the incident.270 Thus, the barge owner’s failure to have a
bargee on board without any reasonable excuse was breach of duty of reasonable care;
in other words, the barge owner failed to do what a reasonable person would do under
similar circumstances.271

3) Causation

With the establishment of breach of duty, the plaintiff must also prove a causal
connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injuries, offering
both factual cause and proximate cause. The plaintiff first must prove the “but for”
causation (i.e., but for the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff would not have
suffered injuries).272 However, where there are two or more causes of harm to the
plaintiff and either of the causes alone would have been sufficient to bring about harm,
the “substantial factor” test applies for the first causal determination (i.e., where each
of several defendants was a substantial factor in causing injury).273
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After establishing factual causation, the plaintiff next must prove proximate
cause. Proximate cause concerns under what circumstances the law will recognize
liability and involves the question of the scope of duty.274 Thus, the foreseeability of
the plaintiff’s injury is relevant. 275 In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 276 the
plaintiff was standing on a platform at the defendant's railroad, waiting for a train.277 At
the same platform, another train was leaving and two men were running forward to
catch it.278 One of them got on the train, but another man with a small package seemed
unsteady when jumping onto the car.279 A guard on the car reached forward to help the
second man in, and another guard on the platform pushed him from behind.280 Instantly,
the package fell and its contents exploded, striking the plaintiff at the other end of the
platform.281 Because nothing in the appearance indicated that the package contained
fireworks, the court held that the risk of harm to the plaintiff was not reasonably
foreseeable to the ordinarily prudent eye and that the defendant was not liable.282 In
other words, liability should not attach if the risk of harm to a person was not within the
zone of danger in the eyes of a reasonable person.283 Thus, even if an act of God comes
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into play, a defendant may still be held liable for the injury resulting from it as long as it
is foreseeable.284

4) Damages

There is no liability for negligence in the absence of damages to the plaintiff.285
Damages include many perspectives: financial losses, personal injuries, harm to
property, increased risk of disease, and fear.286 In general, there are two types of
damages available to a plaintiff in a tort action: compensatory damages and punitive
damages.287 Compensatory damages include both economic and non-economic losses
resulting from personal injuries or property damages.288 Compensatory damages are
the primary instrument of recovery in tort, and they seek to restore the plaintiff to the
status quo before suffering harm by paying an amount equal to the value of interests
diminished or destroyed.289 On the other hand, punitive damages are awarded only
for particularly egregious behavior.290 Sometimes punitive damages can properly be
awarded in strict liability actions.291 However, although punitive damages do punish
the tortfeasor, the primary purpose of punitive damages is to create additional
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deterrence where an actual damages remedy is deemed insufficient to induce an
efficient level of deterrence.292

B. Liability for Common Carriers

In Taiwan, liability for common carriers is subject to special treatment. 293
However, in the American common law, negligence still is the liability rule for
common carriers. In Bethel v. New York City Transit Authority, 294 the plaintiff
boarded a bus operated by the defendant and was injured when the “wheelchair
accessible seat” collapsed upon his sitting down.295 The trial court instructed the jury
that a common carrier has a duty to use the highest degree of care in the maintenance
of its vehicles and equipment, but the New York Court of Appeals held that the single,
reasonable person standard is sufficiently flexible by itself to allow the court to instruct
the jury to fully take into account the ultrahazardous nature of a tortfeasor's activity.296
Specifically, the court reasoned that:297
There is no empirical or policy basis why, in the case of common carriers, the
reasonable care standard is not similarly sufficient to permit triers of fact to take
into account all of the hazardous aspects of public transportation in deciding
whether due care was exercised in a particular case.
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For this reason, the court concluded that the rule of a common carrier's duty of
extraordinary care is no longer viable.298
Similarly, in Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc.,299 the plaintiff was a passenger on
a United Airlines flight; upon the plane’s arrival at the gate, a briefcase fell from an
overhead compartment, seriously injuring the plaintiff.300 The court reasoned that the
degree of care and diligence which the common carrier must exercise is only such as
can reasonably be exercised consistent with the character and mode of conveyance
adopted and the practical operation of its business.301 Under this rule, a common carrier
is not an insurer of its passenger’s safety, and the negligence principle applies. 302
However, in the situation of ground damages resulting from an aviation activity,
Section 520A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes strict liability on the
operator or the owner of an aircraft by providing that:303
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is caused by the
ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object
from the aircraft,
(a) the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability for the harm, even though
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it, and
(b) the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he has authorized
298
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or permitted the operation.

3.3 Strict Liability

Strict liability is liability without fault–liability imposed upon the defendant even
if he neither intentionally acted nor failed to exercise reasonable care.304 Because this
doctrine is extremely ancient, there is no clear demarcation of the emergence of this
principle in the context of historical development of common law.305 Typically, strict
liability is available in three categories of cases: liability for animals, abnormally
dangerous activities, and products liability.

A. Liability for Animals

One of the earliest forms of strict liability in common law involves those who
possess, confine, and manage animals that are capable of causing harm both to
persons and property when they escape confinement.306 In McKee v. Trisler,307 the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover damages for the killing of
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one mule and injury to another mule by the defendant’s trespassing bull. The court
reasoned that:308
It was the rule of the common law that the owner of domestic animals such as
cattle was bound at his peril to keep them off the lands of other persons or respond
in damages for their trespasses. No man was bound to fence his close against an
adjoining field, but every man was bound to keep his cattle in his own field at his
own peril, and it made no difference that he was guilty of no actual negligence in
not properly guarding them or that they escaped against his will and without such
negligence.
Thus, the keeper of animals of a kind likely to roam and harm others is strictly liable
for their trespass under traditional common law.309
In other situations, the cases involve wild animals. Generally, courts impose
strict liability on the possessors of livestock and wild animals, but they hold
possessors of domestic animals liable only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant
knew that the animal had vicious propensities. 310 In Lewis v. Great Southwest
Corp.,311 the plaintiff purchased a ticket and entered the defendants’ petting zoo with
her son and her grandchildren.312 Although there was no harassment of the animals
and nothing had occurred which would be calculated to cause excitement to the animals,
one of the goats in the petting zoo struck the plaintiff in the knee, knocking her down.313
Because there was no evidence 1) of prior knowledge on the part of the defendants as to
308
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danger; 2) that the defendants should have been on notice of danger; and 3) that the
domestic goats in question were not by law “naturally” dangerous, the court refused to
impose strict liability on the defendants.314
In the case of wild animals, courts tend to apply strict liability. In Marshall v.
Ranne, 315 the plaintiff and the defendant owned neighboring farms. 316 The
defendant’s hog escaped from the farm and entered the plaintiff’s farm several weeks
before the incident. 317 One day the plaintiff went to feed his hog and saw the
trespassing hog a hundred yards behind the barn.318 On the plaintiff’s way back home,
the defendant’s hog attacked him.319 The court held that a suit for damages caused by
vicious animals should be governed by principles of strict liability.320
The common law rules of liability for animals were then synthesized in the
Restatements of the Law published by the American Law Institute.321 In the latest
edition, the rules for animals are provided in the following three provisions.
1) Section 21 in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm holds a possessor of livestock or other animals strictly liable when his livestock
314
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or animals intrude upon the land of another and cause injuries. Specifically, the rule
states that:322
An owner or possessor of livestock or other animals, except for dogs and cats, that
intrude upon the land of another is subject to strict liability for physical harm
caused by the intrusion.

2) Section 22 in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm imposes strict liability on a possessor of a wild animal by providing that:323
(a) An owner or possessor of a wild animal is subject to strict liability for physical
harm caused by the wild animal.
(b) A wild animal is an animal that belongs to a category of animals that have not
been generally domesticated and that are likely, unless restrained, to cause
personal injury.

3) Section 23 in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm imposes strict liability on the possessor of an animal if he knows or reasonably
should know that the animal has certain dangerous propensities:324
An owner or possessor of an animal that the owner or possessor knows or has
reason to know has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is
subject to strict liability for physical harm caused by the animal if the harm ensues
from that dangerous tendency.
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B. Abnormally Dangerous Activities

In the contemporary world, the traditional animal rules are of trivial
consequence.325 Rather, a more important common law doctrine of strict liability
concerns the liability for ultrahazardous activities.326 This rule emerged from an early
English case addressing non-natural use of land: Rylands v. Fletcher.327 In that case,
the plaintiff was a tenant mining coal under agreement with the landowner; and the
two defendants were operating a cotton mill on a nearby land. 328 The defendants
erected a reservoir on their land.329 However, the water broke out of the reservoir and
flooded into both the abandoned mining shafts beneath the defendants’ land and into
the adjoining coalmines owned by the plaintiff.330 The House of Lords affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, holding that because the defendants
engaged in non-natural use of their land, they were strictly liable for the injuries to the
plaintiff resulted from the escape of water.331 Justice Blackburn, for the Court of
Exchequer Chamber, wrote that:332
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[T]he true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his
land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must
keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is primâ facie answerable for all the
damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
Given the qualifications stipulated by the House of Lords, the emphasis was thus
shifted to the abnormal and inappropriate character of the defendants’ reservoir in coal
mining country rather than the mere tendency of all water to escape.333
The American doctrine of strict liability for hazardous activities developed when
courts began to embrace strict liability theory proposed by Rylands.334 The doctrine
was enlisted in the first edition of the Restatements of Torts335 and was expanded in
the second edition, with a change of label from “ultrahazardous activities” to
“abnormally dangerous activities.” Section 519 in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
imposes strict liability on a person carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity by
providing that:336
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
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When determining whether an activity is “abnormally dangerous,” Section 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts writes that the following six factors must be
considered:337
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
In the latest edition of the Restatements of Torts, the two sections in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts are combined into Section 20 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm:338
(a) An actor who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict
liability for physical harm resulting from the activity.
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if:
(1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm
even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and
(2) the activity is not one of common usage.
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The typical cases for abnormally dangerous activities involve the storage of
explosives or inflammable liquids, blasting, the accumulation of sewage, the emission
of creosote fumes, or pile driving, which causes excessive vibration.339
Recently, the doctrine has extended to nuclear incidents. In Cook v. Rockwell
Intern. Corp.,340 plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant who operated a
nuclear weapon manufacturing facility—the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons
Plant—under government contract.341 This action arose under the Price–Anderson
Act342 because it was an action in which the plaintiffs sought to impose liability arising
out of a nuclear incident—releases of plutonium and other hazardous substances from
the plant.343 The court reasoned that the existing Price–Anderson system rests on the
assumption that courts would apply “legal principles akin to those of strict liability in
the event of a serious nuclear incident.”344 To accomplish this goal, Congress required
participants in the nuclear industry to waive certain defenses to liability including any
issue or defense based on the fault of the nuclear actor and the conduct of the injured
party.345 Furthermore, Congress explicitly reiterated that strict liability be the standard
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of care for ENOs346 when it reauthorized the waiver requirements in the 1988 Price–
Anderson Amendments Act with the imposition of “federal strict liability or ‘no-fault’
standard” for any extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 347 As for non-extraordinary
nuclear occurrence, Congress also expressed its intent that strict liability would apply to
non-ENO nuclear incidents.348

C. Products Liability

Modern expansion of strict liability doctrine began with the products liability
revolution during the 1960s. Justice Traynor is a pioneer in the process because of his
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.349 In that case, the plaintiff
waitress suffered injuries when a bottle of Coca Cola broke in her hand and she brought
an action arguing that the defendant company was negligent in selling bottles
containing a carbonated beverage, which was dangerous and likely to explode on
account of excessive pressure of gas or by reason of some defect in the bottle.350 The
majority opinion held that because the defendant had exclusive control over both
charging [the bottles with pressurized gas] and inspecting them, the plaintiff was
entitled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference of negligence
346
347
348
349
350
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on the defendant’s part.351 However, Justice Traynor suggested that a manufacturer
incur an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human beings.352 Specifically, Traynor reasoned that:353
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects
that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into
the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury
they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market…The injury
from a defective product does not become a matter of indifference because the
defect arises from causes other than the negligence of the manufacturer, such as
negligence of a submanufacturer of a component part whose defects could not be
revealed by inspection or unknown causes that even by the device of res ipsa
loquitur cannot be classified as negligence of the manufacturer…[In the
MacPherson case,]354 Judge Cardozo's reasoning recognized the injured person as
the real party in interest and effectively disposed of the theory that the liability of
the manufacturer incurred by his warranty should apply only to the immediate
purchaser. It thus paves the way for a standard of liability that would make the
manufacturer guarantee the safety of his product even when there is no negligence.

In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,355 the plaintiff brought an action for
damages against the retailer and the manufacturer of a combination power tool.356 The
plaintiff received the power tool from his wife as a present, and at one time he used the
tool as a lathe for turning a large piece of wood he wished to make into a chalice.357
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After he had worked on the piece of wood several times without difficulty, a part of the
machine suddenly flew out, striking him on the forehead and inflicting serious
injuries. 358 Justice Traynor delivered the opinion of the court and held that a
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being.359
The purpose of imposition of strict liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products
on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves. 360 Under this doctrine, to establish the manufacturer’s liability it was
sufficient that the plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the power tool in the
way it was intended to be used, as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of
which the plaintiff was not aware, that rendered the power tool unsafe for its intended
use.361
Greenman marked an important step of the products liability revolution and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts further adopted this case’s strict liability rationale in
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1965. Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:362
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Comment a. on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly states that
the rule is one of strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to the user or
consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
the product.363 Thus, a manufacturer can be held liable even if it maintained reasonable
quality control and there was no negligence in the design process, and a retailer can be
held liable even though it was not involved in the manufacturing or design process.364
After the United States initiated the strict products liability scheme, the liability
revolution expanded to Europe when the European Economic Community adopted the
Products Liability Directive in 1985.365 In 1994, strict products liability was further
362
363
364
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introduced to Taiwan under Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law.366
3.4 Tests for Strict Liability
The common law liability rule does not suggest a transition from negligence to
strict liability. Rather, common law followed a liability rule akin to strict liability
before the invention of negligence.367 However, although strict liability is an old
common law doctrine, its legal justifications have evolved over time. Specifically,
legal scholars of different generations provided distinct insights into this doctrine, and
the next part of this Dissertation will introduce the different tests for the doctrine of
strict liability.

A. Posner’s Comments on Strict Liability

Richard Posner analyzed strict liability under economic theories. In Strict
Liability: A Comment,368 he argued against using the principle of strict liability to
resolve legal conflicts over resource use.369 In addition, he argued that the economic
goal of liability rules in an accident is to maximize the joint value of the interfering
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activities,370 and the value-maximizing solution involves changes by both parties in
their present behavior, or by one or another only, or by neither. 371 Significantly,
negligence approach, with a contributory negligence defense, will lead to an efficient
solution by invoking cost-justified precautions.372 On the other hand, a principle of
strict liability, without a defense of contributory negligence, would not lead to an
efficient solution in cases where the efficient solution is for the plaintiff alone to take
avoidance measures and where the efficient solution consists of precautions by both
parties.373 To induce the plaintiff to take cost-justified precautions, we need to pair
strict liability with a contributory negligence defense. 374 Accordingly, under
economic theory, there is no preference for negligence or for strict liability, provided
that some version of contributory negligence defense is recognized.375
However, there are differences in economic effect. First, under negligence a
defendant will not be held liable for unavoidable accidents, whereas under strict
liability he will be.376 Yet the imposition of strict liability on the defendant gives the
plaintiff no incentive to change his activity level despite the fact that the plaintiff’s
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change of activity will eliminate damages at zero cost.377 Second, strict liability
expands the universe of claims and encourages more monetary expenses on the
litigation by increasing the scope of liability. 378 Third, strict liability permits the loss
to be spread more widely.379 If the cost of insuring is lower for the defendant than for
the plaintiff, there is a ground to prefer strict liability.380 Additional considerations
come into play where there is a buyer-seller relationship between the victim and the
injurer.381 If the buyers are risk-preferring, they may be unwilling to pay for a safety
improvement, and a higher level of safety is not optimum in the economic sense
because it is higher than consumers want it to be.382 Moreover, in circumstances
where consumers lack knowledge of product safety or even neglect small hazards or
great but otherwise unknown risks, sellers may be discouraged from advertising,
marketing, or even adopting safety improvements because they may lose to their
rivals by disclosing to consumers that the products contain hazards of which they may
not have been aware or may have been only dimly aware. 383 In this regard, even if we
hold the sellers strictly liable, the sellers still will adopt cost-justified precautions to
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minimize liability to injured consumers.384 Even if we assume producers in other
industries will stand to gain from exposing an unsafe product, the gain is possibly
small if their products are not close substitutes for the unsafe product. 385 In summary,
whether a general substitution of strict liability for negligence will improve efficiency
seems to be conjectural.386
In Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,387 the defendant loaded
20,000 gallons of liquid acrylonitrile, a toxic chemical, into a railroad tank car to be
shipped to a Cyanamid plant in New Jersey.388 The car arrived at the Blue Island yard
owned by the plaintiff on the morning of January 9, 1979. 389 Several hours after its
arrival, the toxic fluid cargo broke out of the bottom outlet of the car.390 The Illinois
Department of Environmental Protection ordered the plaintiff to take decontamination
measures, and the plaintiff brought an action to recover the expenses alleging that 1) the
defendant was negligent in maintaining the tank car and 2) the transportation of
acrylonitrile in bulk through the Chicago metropolitan area is an abnormally dangerous
activity.391
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As a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Posner
delivered the opinion of the case. In this case, he spent considerable time discussing
the choice between negligence and strict liability. Specifically, he reasoned that:392
The baseline common law regime of tort liability is negligence. When it is a
workable regime, because the hazards of an activity can be avoided by being
careful, there is no need to switch to strict liability. Sometimes, however, a
particular type of accident cannot be prevented by taking care but can be avoided,
or its consequences minimized, by shifting the activity in which the accident
occurs to another locale, where the risk or harm of an accident will be less, or by
reducing the scale of the activity in order to minimize the number of accidents
caused by it. By making the actor strictly liable … we give him an incentive … to
experiment with methods of preventing accidents that involve not greater
exertions of care, assumed to be futile, but instead relocating, changing, or
reducing … the activity giving rise to the accident. The greater the risk of an
accident and the costs of an accident if one occurs, the more we want the actor to
consider the possibility of making accident-reducing activity changes; the stronger,
therefore, is the case for strict liability … [I]f an activity is extremely common …
it is unlikely either that its hazards are perceived as great or that there is no
technology of care available to minimize them; so the case for strict liability is
weakened.
The analysis encompassed all elements of Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts to determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous.393 In short, Judge
Posner suggested that strict liability is preferable only if negligence is inadequate in
deterring accidents—for example, in situations where changes in activity level are
desired as the means of accident avoidance. In this case, the leak was not caused by the
inherent properties of acrylonitrile but rather was caused by carelessness, and such
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accidents are adequately deterred by the threat of liability for negligence.394 Moreover,
the plaintiff failed to show that the transportation of acrylonitrile in bulk by rail through
populated areas is so hazardous an activity, even when due care is exercised, that the
law should seek to create incentives to relocate the activity to non-populated areas, or to
reduce the scale of the activity, or to switch to transporting acrylonitrile by road rather
than by rail.395 In fact, Judge Posner argued that the accident in this case might have
been prevented at reasonable cost by greater care on the part of those who handled the
tank car of acrylonitrile, but it is difficult to see how it might have been prevented at
reasonable cost by a change in the activity of transporting the chemical. 396 Hence, he
suggested this not be the case for strict liability.397

B. Calabresi’s Cheapest Cost Avoider Test for Strict Liability

Guido Calabresi (now Senior Judge) suggested that the principal function of
accident law be to reduce the sum of accident costs and accident avoidance costs.398
In Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,399 he and Professor Jon Hirschoff
rejected the cost-benefit analysis under the Hand test because it entails impractical
assumptions that injurers had the requisite foresight with regard to costs of accident
394
395
396
397
398
399

See supra note 387 at 1179.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
Id.
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970).
81 Yale L. J. 1055 (1972).
97

avoidance.400 Rather, they proposed that the proper test for liability is the cheapest
cost avoider test.401 Put simply, the court just needs to find out whether the injurer (at
a category level) or the victim (at a category level) was in better position to make the
cost-benefit analysis and to act on it.402 The question for the court reduces to a search
for the cheapest cost avoider.403 For example, strict products liability is preferable
when the manufacturer (as a category) is in a better position to compare the existing
accident costs with the costs of avoiding a certain type of accident by developing
either a new products or a test which would serve to identify the chance of risk.404
Similarly, in determining whether to impose strict liability on the injurer for
conducting ultrahazardous activities or to discharge the injurer’s liability through the
doctrine of assumption of risk, the courts in effect express judgments as to whether
the injurer (as a category) or the victim (as a category) is in a better position to avoid
the risk by altering his behavior.405 Therefore, the shift to the strict liability test is
premised partly upon a desire to accomplish better primary accident reduction
because strict liability, with the test to search for the cheapest cost avoider, is better
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able to accomplish a minimization of the sum of accident costs and of accident
avoidance costs.406
In addition, strict liability is a more approachable test than the Hand test that
requires calculus of fault.407 Finally, other considerations will often predominate in
determining liability rules and should be taken into account, including the preference
of loss spreading or of a given distribution of wealth (e.g. better wealth equality or
compensation of maltreated castes) and a desire to instead further dynamic efficiency
goals by favoring the entrepreneurs in a society.408 Nevertheless, all of them, together
with the efficiency notion of minimizing the sum of accident and accident avoidance
costs, are part of what is at times called “justice.”409 Thus, the move away from the
Hand test toward a test of strict liability can be explained by articulating the different
distributional effects and goals between the two.410

C. Schwartz on the Ethics of Strict Liability

Professor Gary Schwartz demonstrated similarities between negligence and strict
liability, arguing that the ethics of strict liability are not so hostile to the negligence
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principle.411 First, he found that the developments of the strict liability regime were
either simply consistent with some forms of reasonableness tests or immaterial to the
proposal for additional strict liability rules.

412

For example, liability for

ultrahazardous activities bears some inquiries of reasonableness, such as the
cost-benefit analysis.413 Furthermore, modern design defect determination requires
risk-benefit analysis.

414

The same features also are available in workers’

compensation schemes in which the injured employee is a participant in the tort
system and employer’s negligence still plays an important role in determining the
ultimate liability; a question arises concerning how convincing the arguments on strict
liability’s behalf are.415
Second, the ethics of strict liability are similar to negligence features. 416
Significantly, the purely ethical arguments in favor of strict liability seem to
frequently encounter difficulties of a sort that encourage their supporters to seek the
assurance of negligence-like positions. 417 In Siegler v. Kuhlman, 418 the defendant
drove a truck with loaded gasoline in the truck tank and the trailer tank.419 While
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running downgrade on the off-ramp of a highway interchange, the defendant felt a jolt
and found that the trailer disengaged and crashed through a highway fence, landing
upside down on the road.420 An explosion ensued, killing the plaintiff when her vehicle
encountered a pool of the spilled gasoline.421
After analyzing the concurring opinion in Siegler, Schwartz found that the
concurrence demonstrates the plain persistence of the negligence idea (i.e. the court’s
effort in inquiring into the cause of the jolt, its willingness to apply res ipsa loquitur
with respect to the cause of the jolt, and its proposition that strict liability applies only if
the explosion occurred without the apparent intervention of any outside force beyond
the control of the manufacturer, the owner, or the operator of the truck).422 In this
regard, only when an inquiry into the accident ends up in complete frustration (e.g.
evidence regarding proof of negligence was destroyed during explosion) does the
imposition of strict liability on the activity itself become acceptable as a fallback
solution.423
In summary, Schwartz argued that it is negligence rather than strict liability that
plays a substantial role in a tort system.424 Thus, in a society where only rarely can
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human activities directly result in harms even when nothing goes wrong,425 whatever
ethical notions relate to the simple factor of causation will plainly not suffice to justify
any major new proposals for strict liability.426

D. Priest’s Historical Review of Strict Enterprise Liability

Professor George Priest provided the most commonly cited justifications for the
doctrine of strict liability in Taiwan. In The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law,427 he analyzed
how strict enterprise liability was invented by introducing 1) Francis Bohlen’s benefit
theory and the theory’s relevance to internalization and risk distribution rationales; 2)
Fleming James’ advocacy of the centrality of risk distribution and his effort to extend
the internalization concept to automobile accidents; and 3) Friedrich Kessler’s studies
on the unequal bargaining power resulting from the monopoly of large enterprises and
from their uses of standardized contract, the renunciation of freedom of contract, and
the need to protect the consumers by direct efforts.428 Together, their works constitute
the basis of the theory of strict enterprise liability and contribute to the outbreak of
strict products liability during the 1950s and the 1960s.429
425
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Additionally, Priest demonstrated why the movement toward strict products
liability was successful.430 After thirty years of scholarship, cases such as Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.431 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.432 along
with Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts433 contribute to the wide
recognition of the strict enterprise liability founded on the rising consensus of that
time regarding the advantages of internalization and risk distribution and on the need
to protect the relatively powerless consumers.434 Moreover, strict enterprise liability
appoints the judge an agent of the modern state.435 In contrast to negligence or
warranty law, which focus on the one specific incident of product use before the court,
strict enterprise liability charges the judge to internalize costs, to distribute risks, and
to aid the poor.436 By incorporating a conception of a stronger judicial role in a
complex governing state, strict enterprise liability gained quick acceptance within the
judicial system.437
To summarize, Priest believed that the development of strict enterprise liability
was premised upon three presuppositions: 1) relatively greater power of the
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manufacturer to control product safety; 2) manufacturer’s ability to spread loss
through a small insurance premium in the price charged for the product; and 3) the
benefit of internalization in encouraging safety investments.438

3.5 Retreat From Strict Liability?

Strict liability is not bulletproof after its mid-twentieth century expansion.
Specifically,

the

six-factor

test

for

abnormally

dangerous

activities

and

product-related actions premised upon defective design and failure to warn raise
intractable questions for the doctrine of strict liability. The following discussions
present important critiques to strict liability, which in effect, reflects a general concern
over the widely-applauded “superior doctrine.”

A. Scholarly Comments

1) Abnormally Dangerous Activities
As Schwartz observed, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities bears
some inquiries of reasonableness and raises the concern as to how convincing the
arguments in favor of strict liability are.439 The imposition of strict liability under the
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second version of the Restatement of Torts is premised upon the determination of
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous.440 To determine whether an activity is
abnormally dangerous, the test under Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
includes the following six factors: 1) the existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land or chattels of others; 2) the likelihood that the harm that
results from it will be great; 3) the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care; 4) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 5)
the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 6) the
extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.441 The Section 520 test involves cost-benefit evaluation with respect to the
reasonableness of a specific activity.442 Hence, applying the Section 520 test, the
courts unavoidably conduct negligence determinations if all six factors are to be
considered, as Judge Posner did in Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.443
For example, the fifth element under the test is essentially a test of negligence.444
Additionally, the sixth element within the test calls for a balancing of the costs and
benefits of an activity, and courts are capable of conducting such analysis well under a
440

See supra 85. The latest version of the Restatement of Torts also adopts the same rule. See supra 86
for Subsection (a) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 20 (2010).
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See supra 86.
442
See supra note 325 at 970. The cost-benefit analysis derived from the Hand test is an economic
meaning of negligence. A Theory of Negligence, supra note 38 at 32.
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See supra note 387.
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Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1911, 1925
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rule of negligence, thereby eliminating the need to shift from negligence to strict
liability.445
Furthermore, for disputes under strict liability to be adjudicable, the boundaries
of the liability must be relatively specific and must not depend on fact-sensitive
risk-utility calculations.446 In other words, the court cannot rely on the reasonableness
test under Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to define abnormally
dangerous activities and to impose strict liability on the defendant for harms resulting
from dangerous activities. 447 Otherwise, the bases of strict liability are better
interpreted under negligence theory by asking whether the injurer made reasonable
decisions about activity based matters, thus reducing the doctrine of strict liability to
an unjustified and superfluous doctrinal container for addressing unintentional torts.448
In that case, strict liability is better absorbed within negligence.449
2) Products Liability
The situations are more difficult for strict liability in product cases. Schwartz
made the following comments about the matter:450
[Products liability law] largely comprises merely an intelligent rounding off of
the rights independently available under a mature negligence system…[T]o say
that a product is “defective” is to say that the product is “wrong” or “faulty” in
445
446
447
448
449
450

Id. at 1928.
James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 377, 391 (2003).
Id.
The Death of Strict Liability, supra note 25 at 246.
Id.
See supra note 325 at 971.
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some significant respect, and product fault is almost always associated with some
negligence for which the manufacturer properly can be held responsible.
More particularly, strict products liability does not function very well in design defect
and failure to warn cases. In Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company,451 the
plaintiffs brought a design defect action for injuries incurred from using pneumatic
hand tools manufactured by the defendants, claiming that the tools were defectively
designed because they exposed the plaintiffs to excessive vibration. 452 In imposing
strict liability on the defendants, the court reasoned that:453
[W]e emphasize that our adoption of a risk-utility balancing component to our
consumer expectation test does not signal a retreat from strict tort liability. In
weighing a product's risks against its utility, the focus of the jury should be on the
product itself, and not on the conduct of the manufacturer.
However, this product-conduct distinction is illusory, for in effect the court held the
defendant liable for failure to adopt a cost-justified safer design, which was a
conduct-oriented determination.454 Perhaps the courts simply refused to acknowledge
that the doctrine of negligence truly is the legal standard to be applied in risk-utility
determinations of design defect cases.455

451

694 A.2d 1319 (1997).
Id. at 1324-25.
453
Id. at 1334.
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Such distinction also is illusory in failure to warn cases. See Michael A. Pittenger, Reformulating
the Strict Liability Failure to Warn, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1509, 1518-19 (1996).
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Secondly, although courts talk about the manufacturer’s liability for failure to
warn as though strict liability applies,456 such liability actually rests on negligence
because it identifies the important aspects of product use and consumption that
manufacturers can and should control through their marketing and renders them
adjudicable by insisting on credible and technically legitimate evidence regarding
how the manufacturers could have reduced generic product risks at acceptable
costs.457 As a matter of fact, some courts openly apply negligence for failure to warn
rather than stick to the doctrine of strict liability. In Olson v. Prosoco, Inc.,458 the
plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the splashing of hydrochloric acid based cleaner
because the bung closure of the drum storing the cleaner popped out of the drum while
he was moving it.459 He and members of his family brought a failure to warn action
against the defendant. 460 The court explicitly held that the correct submission of
instructions regarding a failure to warn claim for damages falls under a theory of
negligence and the claim should not be submitted as a theory of strict liability.461

456

A manufacturer will be held liable under a theory of strict products liability where the product is
defective and the defect may include a mistake in manufacturing, an improper design or the absence or
inadequacy of warnings. See Belling v. Haugh's Pools, Ltd., 126 A.D.2d 958, 959 (1987).
457
See supra note 446 at 403-04. The phrase “generic product risks” embraces design defect and
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the single unit which is flawed. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 179 (2011) [hereinafter cited as P RODUCTS LIABILITY PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS].
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Thirdly, comment j. on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
illustrates the importance of knowledge in failure to warn cases:462
Where … the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of the
population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally
known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to
find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger.
Once the court requires proof of knowledge as a necessary element of failure to warn
in applying Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the strict liability
action begins to look much like its negligence counterpart.463 This argument could
fairly be demonstrated by the text of Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:464
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is
subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with
the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or
of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
In other words, the analysis for strict liability failure to warn is virtually identical to
negligent failure to warn, which requires proof of defendant’s knowledge and involves
462
463
464

Comment j. on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
See supra note 454 at 1515.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
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risk-utility test to determine whether a warning is required; under either theory the
reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct effectively becomes the determinative
factor.465
When product cost is a factor in the risk-utility test for determining defectiveness,
“strict” products liability is merely a reflection of the burdens of the manufacturing
process, thereby making the distinction between defectiveness and negligence
unnecessary.466 In this way, when “strict” products liability requires the plaintiff to
prove defectiveness to make the defendant liable, it is very much like negligence
liability because the concept of defectiveness is so close to negligence that a
distinction is not worth the effort to maintain.467 Finally, although strict liability is
desired for affording greater protection to the victim through inducing more care on
the part of the potential injurer, this argument is illusory. 468 Even though the
proposition of greater safety is practicable, it fails to explain the selective application
of strict liability to product cases only.469 Therefore, while strict liability is widely
considered a huge step of progress in the Taiwanese legal system, American scholars
identified several predicaments in applying this doctrine. A question to be answered is
whether strict liability is a superior option to negligence in any respect.
465
466
467
468
469

See supra note 454 at 1517.
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B. Practical Reforms

As mentioned previously, aviation is considered an abnormally dangerous
activity under Section 520A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the operator or
owner of an aircraft is subject to strict liability for ground damages resulting from
aviation activities.470 However, according to a special note by the Reporter under
comment k. on Section 20 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm, aviation is no longer an abnormally dangerous activity.471
Specifically, the note states that:472
[T]he majority opinion in Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co.473 is correct in concluding
that aviation does not fit the formal Restatement criteria for an abnormally
dangerous activity. The risk of serious ground damage when all reasonable care is
exercised is very small; and given both the number of flights and the percentage of
the population that travels by air, commercial aviation is in common usage.
Nevertheless … one rationale for strict liability relates to the defendant's exclusive
control over the instrumentality of harm, and this rationale is impressively
applicable in aviation ground-damage cases … Even so, the doctrinal argument
against strict liability—that almost all airline crashes are due to
negligence—confirms that the strict-liability issue is no longer one that has major
practical significance.

Similar reforms took place in the Products Liability Restatement. Section 2 in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability applies a reasonableness test to

470
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See supra 79-80.
Comment k. on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 20 (2010).
Id.
746 P.2d 1198 (Wash. 1987).
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determine whether a product is defectively designed or whether a warning of a
product is insufficient:474
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe.
In contrast to manufacturing defects, design defects and defects based on inadequate
instructions or warnings are predicated on a different concept of responsibility. 475
Subsection (b) adopts a “risk-utility balancing” test as the standard for judging the
defectiveness of product designs. 476 Specifically, the test determines whether a
reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative
design by the seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain rendered the product not
474
475
476

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
Comment a. on the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
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reasonably safe.

477

In so interpreting, consumer expectations do not play a

determinative role in judging the defectiveness of product designs because consumer
expectations alone do not take into account whether the proposed alternative design
could be implemented at reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design would
provide greater overall safety.478 Nonetheless, consumer expectations about product
performance and the dangers attendant to product use still affect how risks are
perceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the risks of harm.479 As for
warning defect, Subsection (c) also adopts a reasonableness test for judging the
adequacy of product instructions and warnings.480 The rule thus parallels Subsection
(b), which adopts a similar standard for judging the safety of product designs.481

477
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Chapter Four:

Analysis of Risk Liability

Synopsis




Common law and Civil law share similar laws of negligence.
Common law and Civil law share similar policy justifications for strict liability,
thereby justifying the introduction of common law analysis to discuss Taiwanese
strict liability rules.



Although the areas of law to which strict liability applies are different between the
Taiwanese legal system and the American legal system due to socioeconomic
differences, American laws are still instrumental to Taiwan.



Intermediate liability is a variation under negligence principles which shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant; in this regard, it also is different from res ipsa
loquitur under which the burden of proof still remains on the plaintiff.



Implicit in traditional strict liability is absolute liability under which any form of
contributory negligence is not a valid defense.



Availability of comparative negligence in strict liability, in effect, cripples the
traditional strict liability, but it adequately adjusts the doctrine to induce safety
incentives from both parties.





Strict liability does not provide greater accident avoidance than negligence does.
Benefit theory cannot justify the selective application of strict liability.
Loss spreading alone should NOT be the paramount policy of tort because tort is
an inferior way of insurance.



Intermediate liability is superior to strict liability in regulating highly risky
activities.
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4.1 Overview
In this chapter, this Dissertation proposes that intermediate liability be the
operative rule for risk liability. First, it shows several comparisons to demonstrate
how analysis in the American common law is instrumental for Taiwan, including the
similarities between negligence laws in Taiwan and those in the United States, as well
as the similarities between their policy justifications for strict liability. Furthermore, it
compares how strict liability works differently in the two legal systems. Although the
areas to which strict liability applies are different in the two legal systems, such
distinction is moderate and does not cripple the usefulness of the American law.
Second, it identifies the differences among intermediate liability, res ipsa loquitur, and
strict liability. Third, it analyzes how strict liability was reduced from an absolute
liability principle to a negligence-like doctrine. Fourth, it responds to the tests for
strict liability mentioned in Chapter Three, and argues that strict liability fails to
justify itself on those grounds as an independent liability regime. In contrast, the only
practicable strict liability rule is the doctrine of equitable liability.482 Finally, it argues
that intermediate liability satisfies the tests for strict liability and is superior to strict
liability as the operative rule for risk liability.

482

Equitable liability is a variation under negligence principles. See supra 52-56.
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4.2 Comparative Tort Laws
Although Taiwan inherited its Civil law system from Germany and developed its
legal theories under the influence of Japanese law, American law influenced the rising
subjects of torts, such as strict products liability, privacy laws, and the concepts of
wrongful birth and informed consent.483 Moreover, the negligence principles between
Taiwan and the United States are similar.484 The following comparisons demonstrate
that although Taiwanese tort law and American tort law are different in certain ways,
both share some common characteristics and American tort law is still instrumental.

A. Comparing Laws of Torts

1) Differences
a. Sources of Negligence Law
In Taiwan, negligence is based on the first part of the first paragraph of Article
184.485 Under this rule, the plaintiff must prove six statutory elements to recover.486
On the other hand, negligence in the United States is established by case law.487 Thus,
a primary distinction between negligence laws of the two systems lies on the sources
of law: Taiwan establishes its rule by statute, whereas the United States adopts case
483
484
485
486
487

See supra note 4 at 43.
See infra 118-119.
See supra 37.
See supra 39-46.
See supra note 4 at 63-64.
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law.
b. Structures of Tort Law
The American legal system distinguishes tort law from contract law, but in a
Civil law system both contractual and non-contractual civil wrongs fall under the
heading of laws of obligations.488 In Taiwan, tort and contract rules are parts of the
Civil Code, and the primary tort causes of action are based upon Article 184 of this
Code.489
2) Similarities
a. Functions of Torts
While Taiwanese tort law and American tort law come from different sources,
both share similar characteristics. First, both try to balance individual freedom of
action and the protection of individual rights.490 Section 767 in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts illustrates the balancing test:491
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a
contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not,
consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct,
(b) the actor’s motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
488
489
490
491

See supra note 133 at 403.
See supra 37.
See supra note 4 at 7.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT §767 (1979) (emphasis added).
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(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.

Second, both tort laws in Taiwan and in the American common law ask the tortfeasor
to compensate for actual loss.492 Article 184 of the Civil Code explicitly requires the
tortfeasor to carry out justice by compensating the victim for injury arising out of
tort.493 The same concern is found in American common law in which compensatory
damages are the primary instrument of recovery in tort in order to restore the plaintiff
to the status quo before suffering harms.494 Finally, both Taiwanese tort law and
American tort law serve to deter future harms.495 By establishing clear rules about what
a person could and could not do, tort law facilitates deterrence.496
b. Definitions of Negligence
Negligence is defined as breach of duty of care in both Taiwan and the United
States. More specifically, in Taiwan, negligence occurs when a defendant fails to
exercise duty of care of a good administrator. 497 On the other hand, in American

492
493
494
495
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Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code, supra note 5 at 75.
See supra 37.
See supra note 289.
See supra 38.
See supra note 4 at 10.
See supra 45.
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common law, negligence is breach of duty of care of a reasonably prudent person under
similar circumstances.498 Although the terms are different, the meanings are similar.499
c. Causal Theories
Both Taiwanese tort law and American tort law relies on a two-prong test of
causation. Significantly, Taiwan adopts the theory of adequate causation, which
comprises a conditional relation test and an adequacy test.500 A conditional relation
test analyzes whether the accident would not have occurred but for the defendant’s
tortious act, 501 which is the same test applied under the “but-for” causation in
American common law.502 An adequacy test relies upon whether a reasonable person
would have foreseen the possibility of the damages under the circumstances,503 which
is the same test applied under the proximate cause limitation of American tort law.504
Thus, this Dissertation argues that although Taiwanese tort law and American tort law
are different in terms of sources and structures, both share common characteristics in
primary functions, definitions of negligence, and causal theories.

498

See supra 74.
The terms “care of a good administrator” and “reasonable care” are interchangeable. See, for
instance, supra 50 for text of the first paragraph of Article 190 of the C IVIL CODE.
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B. Comparing Policy Justifications for Strict Liability

In Taiwan, strict liability is justified on the following grounds. First, certain
enterprises or owners of dangerous facilities have control over sources of danger and
thus are better able to avoid harms by taking precautions. 505 In addition, those
enterprises and owners benefit from the exploitation of the sources of danger, and
holding them strictly liable satisfies the notion of justice. 506 Finally, strict liability
assists loss spreading because enterprises are usually those who conduct dangerous
activities and they are better able to shift the losses through pricing mechanisms or
insurance.507 Thus, three justifications speak on behalf of strict liability, including
accident avoidance, justice, and loss spreading.
In the United States, strict liability rules are those involving extraordinary risks
whose existences call for a special responsibility in which tort defendants are held
liable even though they are not negligent or otherwise at fault for the plaintiff’s
harm.508 As mentioned previously, modern strict liability doctrine is premised upon
three presuppositions: 1) the defendant’s relatively greater power to control risks; 2)
the defendant’s ability to spread loss through a small insurance premium in the price
charged for the product; and 3) the benefit of internalization in encouraging safety
505
506
507
508

See supra note 4 at 672.
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Id. at 672-73.
See supra note 49 at 289.
120

investments.509 In this way, both Taiwan and the United States share the same policy
justifications for the doctrine of strict liability, thereby justifying this Dissertation’s
introduction of common law analysis to discuss Taiwanese strict liability rules.
Table 5: Comparative Policy Justifications for Strict Liability
Taiwan

United States

✔

✔

Safety Incentives

✔

✔

Loss Spreading

✔

✔

Defendant’s Ability to
Control Risks

C. Comparing Areas to Which Strict Liability Applies

Both Taiwan and the United States have strict liability rules within their legal
systems; however, the areas of law to which strict liability applies are different
because of the distinctions in social economics and legal institutions.510 Please refer
below to Table 6 for detailed comparisons.

509
510

See supra 103-104 and supra note 133 at 417-18.
See supra note 4 at 668.
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Table 6: Comparative Strict Liability Rules
Taiwan

United States

Default Rule
for
Negligence
Unintentional
Torts

Common

Absolute Liability511
Negligence

Carriers

Strict Liability512

Abnormally
Dangerous

Intermediate Liability

Strict Liability

Intermediate Liability

Strict Liability

Activities

Animals

511

Article 89 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT.
See Article 91 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT, Article 46 of the MASS RAPID TRANSIT ACT, and Article
64 of the HIGHWAY ACT.
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512

Nuclear
Strict Liability
Disasters

Consumer
Civil Code
Products

Manufacturing

Design

Warning

Defect

Defect

Defect

Protection
Law

Liability
Intermediate

Strict
Strict Liability Negligence Negligence

Liability

Liability

4.3 Distinguishing Strict Liability, Intermediate Liability, and Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of strict liability is straightforward. Under strict liability, a person is
held liable regardless of his fault. 513 Because strict liability does not consider the
defendant’s fault, it admits fewer issues than negligence.514 More particularly, there are
just three considerations to take into account in any strict liability case: 1) whether the
defendant caused the plaintiff’s harm; 2) the extent of harm; and 3) whether the plaintiff
acted reasonably.515 As a result, the relative certainty of the defendant’s liability under

513
514
515

See supra 19.
See supra note 49 at 304-05.
Id.
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strict liability reduces the rate of litigation by encouraging pre-litigation settlements.516
In other words, a defendant subject to strict liability should be more likely to settle out
of court, thereby significantly reducing the costs of administering the tort system.517
Moreover, the average administrative costs of resolving strict liability claims are
likely to be lower than the costs of resolving negligence claims, because under
negligence principles, the court has to calculate the cost and effectiveness of different
levels of care that might have reduced the probability or magnitude of harm.518
In contrast, the doctrine of intermediate liability still works under a fault-based
liability regime, since the common characteristic of intermediate liability rules is that
the defendant bears the burden of proof regarding the exercise of reasonable care.519
Put simply, the principle of intermediate liability is only a variation under negligence
principles by shifting the burden of proof in relation to negligence to the defendant.
Accordingly, the court also has to conduct the calculus of fault, and the average
administrative costs of resolving intermediate liability claims are higher than the costs
of resolving strict liability claims.520

516
517
518
519
520

Id.
Id. at 305.
Id.
See supra 47.
See supra note 49 at 305.
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The same is true for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Because the doctrine’s
primary function is to permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence,521 res
ipsa loquitur is also a rule under negligence principles. Consequently, unlike the clear
demarcation between strict liability and fault-based liability, the distinction between
intermediate liability and res ipsa loquitur is vague and deserves more discussion.
According to Section 328D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:522
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence of
the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff.
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may
reasonably be drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn.
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to be drawn
in any case where different conclusions may reasonably be reached.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase meaning “the thing speaks for itself.”523 This
concept originated from an old English case, Byrne v. Boadle.524 Under the majority
rule, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely a rule of evidence, permitting the jury to
draw, from the occurrence of an unusual event, the conclusion that it was the

521
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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1503 (10th ed. 2014).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
Comment a. on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
See supra note 245.
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defendant's fault.525
In McDougald v. Perry,526 the plaintiff was driving behind a tractor-trailer driven
by the defendant.527 As the defendant drove over some railroad tracks, the 130-pound
spare tire came out of its cradle underneath the trailer and fell to the ground.528 The
trailer's rear tires then ran over the spare tire, causing the spare tire to bounce into the air
and collide with the windshield of the plaintiff’s vehicle.529 The spare tire was housed
in a cradle underneath the trailer and was secured by a chain that was wrapped around
the tire and was secured to the body of the trailer by a latch device.530 The court held
that the spare tire escaping from the cradle underneath the truck, resulting in the tire
ultimately becoming airborne and crashing into the plaintiff’s vehicle, is the type of
accident which, on the basis of common experience and as a matter of general
knowledge, would not occur but for the failure to exercise reasonable care by the person
who had control of the spare tire.531 Specifically, the court reasoned that:532
[Res ipsa loquitur] is a rule of evidence that permits, but does not compel, an
inference of negligence under certain circumstances. The doctrine is merely a rule
of evidence. Under it an inference may arise in aid of the proof … Essentially the
injured plaintiff must establish that the instrumentality causing his or her injury
was under the exclusive control of the defendant, and that the accident is one that
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716 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 784.
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Id. at 786.
Id. at 785-86.
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would not, in the ordinary course of events, have occurred without negligence on
the part of the one in control … The plaintiff is not required to eliminate with
certainty all other possible causes or inferences … All that is required is evidence
from which reasonable persons can say that on the whole it is more likely that
there was negligence associated with the cause of the event than that there was not.

In this way, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is very similar to the concept of
prima facie proof (Anscheinsbeweis), which is also a procedural doctrine that
alleviates the plaintiff’s burden of proof in cases where the occurrence of an event, on
the basis of common experience, allows the court to infer the defendant’s negligence.533
For example, the fact that a truck driver drove onto a sidewalk permits the court to
infer that the driver was negligent in driving.534 The primary function of prima facie
proof (Anscheinsbeweis) is to enhance the judge’s ability to determine the facts by
free evaluation.535 This concept has nothing to do with the placement of burden of
proof but rather concerns the appraisal of evidence (Beweiswürdigung).536 Accordingly,
under both res ipsa loquitur and prima facie proof (Anscheinsbeweis) the burden of
proof always remains on the plaintiff.537 From this point of view, strict liability,
intermediate liability, and res ipsa loquitur are distinguishable. The common
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characteristic of the three principles is that all of them, to some degree, relieve the
plaintiff’s burden of proof in relation to the defendant’s negligence. However, strict
liability completely discards the negligence inquiries, whereas intermediate liability
and res ipsa loquitur still require the calculus of fault, with different placements of
burden of proof.

Table 7: Distinguishing Strict Liability, Intermediate Liability, and Res Ipsa
Loquitur
Intermediate
Strict Liability

Res Ipsa Loquitur
Liability

Liability Regime

No-Fault

Fault-Based

Fault-Based

None

Defendant

Plaintiff

Placement of
Burden of Proof in
Relation to Fault
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4.4 The Fall of Absolute Liability

A. Absolute Liability: Defendant Held as an Insurer

Strict liability holds a defendant liable regardless of his fault.538 Given such
heightened responsibility, it is difficult to assess the plaintiff’s proper share of the
overall liability when a claim is litigated.539 Take products liability, for instance.
Early on in the products liability revolution, courts struggled with the question of
whether one could compare fault with defect. 540 To answer the question, the
presuppositions of strict enterprise liability are illustrative, including: 1) relatively
greater power of the manufacturer to control product safety; 2) manufacturer’s ability
to spread loss through a small insurance premium in the price charged for the product;
and 3) the benefit of internalization in encouraging safety investments. 541 As stated
by Professor Fleming James:542
[A] system of absolute liability tends to increase the pressure towards accident
prevention on large groups and enterprises, where we have seen it will do the
most good, rather than on the individual, where it will do relatively little good.
This is so for three reasons: 1) large units are involved in many accidents and
appear often as defendants, rare as claimants; 2) even where the accident is
caused by an individual while acting for himself, in his aspect as potential
defendant he is increasingly becoming covered by liability insurance, so that the
538
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pressure of increased liability is put in the first instance on the insurance
company; and 3) abolition of the defense of contributory negligence–which
usually accompanies a shift to absolute liability–clearly adds a further incentives
to safety on the part of perennial defendants, and if there is a corresponding loss
of incentive it is on the part of the individuals who are potential accident victims.

The implication of the three presuppositions is absolute liability, which means
that any form of contributory negligence is not a valid defense in a strict liability
action.543 Under James’ belief, absolute liability is preferred over a system of liability
based on fault wherever there is an enterprise or activity that benefits society but also
takes a more or less inevitable (if accidental) toll on human life and limb, as strict
enterprise liability helps to cut down accidents and minimize administration costs.544
Significantly, absolute liability totally rejects defenses of any kind, including defenses
that negate causation, defenses that inculpate the plaintiff, and defenses that exonerate
the defendant.545 For example, under Article 89 of the Civil Aviation Act, the owner of
the aircraft is liable not only regardless of fault but also for the damage caused by
force majeure.546 Because a defendant is liable for the injury resulting from an act of
God as long as it is foreseeable,547 the term “force majeure” under Article 89 of this Act
should be interpreted as “an act of God” or events that are unexpected and
543
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uncontrollable.548 In so defining, Article 89 of the Civil Aviation Act is an absolute
liability rule which satisfies the three presuppositions of strict enterprise liability.549
The same is true for strict products liability, as Justice Traynor wrote in his concurring
opinion for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.550 Specifically, he wrote that:551
In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute
liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
beings.
By insuring against unavoidable accidents as well, strict liability has a larger
insurance component,552 and under this doctrine there was no room for the court to
assess the plaintiff’s share of the overall liability.553

B. The Availability of Comparative Negligence

The early absolute liability rule was not free from criticism. Turning back to
Coase’s example of cattle raising and farming, 554 the starting point of Coase’s
analysis is that both activities are reciprocal.555 The presence of both cattle raising
and farming is a prerequisite to any damage to either, so that avoiding harm to one
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party necessarily harms the other.556 The idea of reciprocity of harm leads to the
rationale that inquires into the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.557 In other words,
if Coase is right about the reciprocal nature of harm, and it is possible that the plaintiff,
often enough, would prove to be the cheapest cost avoider, then it becomes important
to take into account the plaintiff’s role in creating or avoiding accidents subject to
strict liability.558
However, under absolute liability the plaintiff has no incentive to take
precautions that might reduce or eliminate the expected accident costs. 559 Specifically,
under absolute liability the potential victim knows that even if he takes no care, the
injurer will be liable if an accident occurs.560 Additionally, there are no ways that the
injurer can escape liability unless he prevents the accident. 561 Knowing all this, the
potential victim has no incentive to spend anything on preventing the accident.562
Consequently, a principle of absolute liability is not efficient in cases where the
efficient solution is for the victim alone to take avoidance measures and where the
efficient solution consists of precautions by both injurers and victims.563 On the other
hand, contributory negligence serves an essential allocative purpose in a strict liability
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
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regime by inducing safety incentives from the potential victim.564 From an economic
point of view, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence should be a valid defense in a
strict liability action and a defendant cannot be an insurer against all possible types of
accidents and injuries.565 Accordingly, years after Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,566
Justice Traynor supported the view that the manufacturer is not an insurer for all
injuries caused by its product.567
As stated previously, the question that baffled early case law was whether one
could compare fault in a strict liability action.568 Under the traditional approach,
contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability. In McCown v. International
Harvester Co.,569 the plaintiff sued the defendant under a strict products liability
theory for injuries sustained while driving a tractor manufactured by the defendant.570
Specifically, the plaintiff struck a guardrail adjoining a shoulder with the right front tire
of the tractor when driving it.571 The collision caused the steering wheel to spin rapidly
in the direction opposite to the turn, and the spokes of the spinning steering wheel
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struck the plaintiff’s right arm, fracturing his wrist and forearm.572 The court explicitly
rejected contributory negligence as a defense to actions grounded under strict products
liability.573
However, the traditional rule is obsolete. After the invention of comparative
negligence under which the plaintiff’s recovery would not be completely barred, courts
have opted for the apparent justice of making each party to an accident bear
responsibility for the losses attributable to that party’s breach of good behavior. 574 In
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 the decedent crashed his vehicle onto a metal
divider fence.576 After the initial impact between the vehicle and the fence the vehicle
spun counterclockwise, the driver's door was thrown open, and the decedent was
forcibly ejected from the car and sustained fatal head injuries.577 The decedent's widow
and three surviving minor children sued the defendants under the theory of strict
products liability.578 In holding that comparative negligence applies to a strict liability
action, the court reasoned that:579
[P]rinciples of comparative negligence … apply to actions founded on strict
products liability, thereby reducing plaintiff's recovery only to the extent that his
own act of reasonable care contributed to his injury … Application of comparative
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principles to strict products liability actions treats alike defenses to both
negligence and strict products liability actions; in each instance, defense, if
established, will reduce but not bar plaintiff's claim … [The] reason for extending
full system of comparative fault to strict products liability is that it is fair to do
so … (remaining text omitted.)

The recognition of comparative negligence in a strict products liability action was
further realized by the Products Liability Restatement. Under Section 17 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,580
(a) A plaintiff's recovery of damages for harm caused by a product defect may be
reduced if the conduct of the plaintiff combines with the product defect to cause
the harm and the plaintiff's conduct fails to conform to generally applicable rules
establishing appropriate standards of care.
(b) The manner and extent of the reduction under Subsection (a) and the
apportionment of plaintiff's recovery among multiple defendants are governed by
generally applicable rules apportioning responsibility.

Having recognized the availability of comparative negligence in a strict liability
action, courts still need to justify their approaches in comparing apples and oranges.581
In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 582 the decedent died in a crash of an airplane
manufactured by the defendant.583 His widow brought an action against the defendant
alleging that design and manufacturing defects in the legs of the cockpit seats caused
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the seat legs to break during the crash, thus causing the decedent’s death. 584 In
discussing the availability of comparative negligence in an action grounded under strict
liability, the court reasoned that:585
Many courts and commentators have labeled this type of loss allocation system
comparative fault. We choose comparative causation instead because it is
conceptually accurate in cases based on strict liability … in which the defendant's
“fault,” in the traditional sense of culpability, is not at issue … Under comparative
causation, Plaintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the manufacturer
or distributor was negligent in the production, design, or dissemination of the
article in question. Defendant's liability for injuries caused by a defective product
remains strict … [T]he product supplier's incentive to eliminate or to reduce
product hazards should remain intact.
Under this rationale, comparative negligence sneaks up in the proximate cause
evaluation as a causal defense. This reasoning might work perfectly when the court
applies contributory negligence to strict liability, since a plaintiff’s misconduct is
considered a superseding cause of the injury under the principle of contributory
negligence, which justifies a complete bar to his recovery. 586 However, when
comparative negligence applies to strict liability, the primary function of this principle
is to apportion responsibility between or among the parties.587

To accomplish this

task, the principle considers determinative factors that include the plaintiff’s
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misconduct, causation, and damages.588 That said, comparative negligence neither
compares the parties’ fault only, nor does it merely explore the percentage of cause
assigned to the plaintiff. The apportionment of liability should rest on the combined
evaluation of the determinative factors rather than on a single element of an accident,
since any single element alone cannot justify the imposition of liability on a chosen
party.589 Similarly, negligence holds a person liable only when there is “negligent
conduct” that “causes harm.”590 Because the principle of comparative negligence in
effect compares the plaintiff’s overall responsibility for failure to exercise care, it is a
rule of liability defense rather than a causal defense.
Assuming, in an accident governed by strict liability, the plaintiff was liable for
his own misconduct for 30% of his injuries, and assuming the defendant could
establish the plaintiff’s comparative negligence, the defendant’s proof of comparative
negligence demonstrated two things: 1) 30% of the injuries resulted from the
plaintiff’s fault and 2) the defendant was not liable in negligence for the 30% injuries.
From a theoretical point of view, requiring the defendant to prove that he was not
negligent is exactly how the doctrine of intermediate liability works. 591 The
distinction between strict liability and intermediate liability lies on the 70% of the
588
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plaintiff’s injuries, for under strict liability the defendant was nonetheless liable, but
under intermediate liability he was able to escape liability by proving that he was not
negligent in causing the injuries. The bottom line is that while the availability of
comparative negligence in a strict liability action is important on the ground of
economic efficiency, it cripples the principle’s character as a rule of absolute liability
and makes it similar to intermediate liability. In other words, strict liability with a
defense of comparative negligence is closely analogous to negligence per se.592 Thus,
Schwartz was right that modern strict liability bears negligence characteristics and
that strict liability and negligence are hardly distinguishable.593
In Taiwan, comparative negligence is the only recognized form of contributory
negligence. Under Article 217 of the Civil Code:594
If the injured person has negligently contributed in causing or aggravating the
injury, the court may reduce or release the amount of the compensation.
If the reason of a grave injury was unknown to the debtor and the injured person
has omitted to call the attention of the debtor beforehand, or to avert, or mitigate
the injury, the injured person will be deemed to be negligently contributed in the
injury.
The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis to
the situation when the agent of the injured person or the person performing the
obligation for the injured person has negligently contributed to the injury.
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Similar rules also are available in the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law595 and in
the Civil Aviation Act.596 Different from the struggles in American case law, courts in
Taiwan widely accept the availability of comparative negligence in an action
grounded under strict liability. In Tai Shang Zi No. 2734 of 1990,597 the Directorate
General of Telecommunications brought a suit against a defendant for recovery
because during construction work the defendant cut the cables that deliver electricity
to telecommunications facilities. At the same time, the defendant argued that the
plaintiff was at fault in changing the original plan and placing the cables beneath his
land without informing him of this fact. According to the second paragraph of Article
45 of the Telecommunications Act,598 compensation shall be made in the event of
damages to telecommunications facilities arising from repairs or construction of
buildings, roads, irrigation ditches, or the laying of underground pipes, cables or other
projects.599 Because compensation under this rule is not premised upon the fault of the
defendant, it is a strict liability rule. In holding that the appellate court erred in failing to
address the plaintiff’s fault, the Supreme Court of Taiwan reasoned that comparative
negligence also is an available defense in a strict liability action. With comparative
595
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negligence holding up as a valid defense in a strict liability action, strict liability in
Taiwan also bears negligence characteristics.

C. Proximate Cause as a Limitation to Liability

In the early days of the products liability revolution, in an effort to distinguish
the then-new strict products liability from negligence, some courts and commentators
sought to eliminate the proximate cause limitation of negligence law.600 However,
this effort proved futile, and proximate cause is alive and well as an element of claims
for strict products liability.601 Because the relevant issue for proximate cause is the
scope of duty, 602 the court in a strict liability action still needs to conduct a
negligence inquiry, thus undermining the claim that strict liability is cheaper to
administer compared with negligence.603 The same is true for Taiwanese law because
both Taiwan and the United States adopt similar causal theories.604 Accordingly, the
distinction between strict liability and negligence is not worth the effort to
maintain.605
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4.5 Responses to Tests for Strict Liability
Because so much has been written about the economic choice between
negligence and strict liability, to examine whether the courts employ negligence
where it is more efficient than strict liability, and vice-versa,606 this Dissertation does
not need to go through that topic in detail.607 Rather, in the following section this
Dissertation will respond to the tests for strict liability mentioned in Chapter Three.608

A. Learned Hand Test v. Cheapest Cost Avoider Test

Before addressing Calabresi’s cheapest cost avoider test, this section has to
briefly discuss the Hand test mentioned in United States v. Carroll Towing.609 Under
the Hand test, if the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden B; then liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P (i.e., whether “B<PL”).610
Under this test, if B is greater than PL, a reasonable person may not take the
precaution.611 If, however, B is less than PL, legal liability may be imposed to induce
the party to prevent accidents, thereby avoiding damages in a civil judgment equal to
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PL.612 Hence, assuming a victim can do nothing to prevent the accident, a potential
injurer is negligent if B is less than PL.613
The Hand Formula works on two assumptions. First, it assumes that risks are
neutral.614 Second, it assumes that calculable risks exist.615 However, where risks
cannot generally be estimated, courts usually justify the exemption of duty with B and
L where B is extremely high and L is only moderate.616 One may argue that it is
unrealistic to expect a layperson to calculate whether B is less than PL before he
acts;617 Judge Hand himself admitted that the calculus of fault under the Hand test is
rarely possible. In Moisan v. Loftus,618 the plaintiff guest passenger brought an action
in negligence against the defendant driver for injuries sustained during the ride, and
Judge Hand wrote the following text:619
[The difficulties in applying the B<PL test] arise from the necessity of applying a
quantitative test to an incommensurable subject matter; and the same difficulties
inhere in the concept of “ordinary” negligence. It is indeed possible to state an
equation for negligence in the form, C equals P times D, in which the C is the care
required to avoid risk, D, the possible injuries, and P, the probability that the
injuries will occur, if the requisite care is not taken. But of these factors care is the
only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate, and often that is not. The
injuries are always a variable within limits, which do not admit of even
612
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approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might theoretically be
estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and, besides, probability
varies with the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such attempts are illusory;
and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention upon which one of the
factors may be determinative in any given situation.
However, when applying the Hand test, courts typically estimate the accident
avoidance costs of the average person in each party’s situation and rely on rough
judgments only.620 Applying an average person standard to determine whether B is
less than PL not only conforms to the layperson’s experience but also prevents courts
from incurring higher costs in administering the legal system.621 Secondly, the Hand
test corresponds to the economic model of individual choices premised upon the
assumption that people rationally take precautions that would generate greater
benefits in avoiding accidents than the precautions would cost.622 Where B is less
than PL, a rational individual will prevent the accident to avoid damages in a civil
judgment equal to PL under the threat of legal liability.623 Finally, active insurance
markets play a critical role in supplying much of the information to the tort system
about the expected values of the costs of accidents and accident avoidance measures,
thereby making the calculus of risk possible under the Hand test.624
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As mentioned previously, the reason that Calabresi chose the cheapest cost
avoider test for legal liability, rather than the cost-benefit analysis under the Hand test,
is that the latter entails impractical assumptions that injurers had the requisite
foresight regarding costs of accidents.625 However, as this Dissertation has argued, in
a practical sense the Hand test never expects perfect foresight from the injurer but
rather rough judgments as a reasonable person could have made prior to the
accident.626 The burdens of required foresight and choices of behavior under the
Hand test are the same in degrees as what the negligence law requires a reasonable
person to do under certain circumstances, and not more.627 Additionally, applied to a
strict products liability scenario, Calabresi’s approach will almost eliminate the
incentive of the potential victim—the user—to adopt a more economical method of
preventing the injury, because liability is almost always imposed on the manufacturer,
who is in the better position to make the cost-benefit analysis and to act on the
decision.628 By rejecting any kind of cost-benefit analysis, Calabresi’s liability rule is
the traditional absolute liability, which does not recognize any form of contributory
negligence as a valid defense.629 Finally, because Calabresi’s approach presumes that

625

See supra 97-98.
See supra note 620.
627
The requirement of strict compliance with the standard of reasonable care makes negligence more
like strict liability, for a defendant nonetheless is held liable when he lacks the ability to exercise
reasonable care. See supra note 79 at 283.
628
See supra note 368 at 213-14.
629
See supra 130.
144
626

every accident is worth preventing, placing legal liability on the party who is the
cheapest cost avoider (but fails to prevent the accident), it is doubtful that “the
cheapest cost avoider” nevertheless will take any precautionary measure when B is
greater than PL or will simply forgo accident avoidance under such circumstances.630

B. Incentives for Accident Avoidance

1) Increased Level of Care v. Due Care
Many judges and commentators believe that strict liability would induce
potential injurers to be more careful than they would be under a negligence
standard.631 For instance, Justice Traynor wrote the following text in his concurring
opinion for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.632
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of
others, as the public cannot.
However, such belief is illusory because a defendant at most will exercise due
care—the point where the burden of taking care equals the expected cost of
liability—under either negligence or strict liability. 633 The Hand test, 634 though
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announced in a negligence case, could properly be applied to this issue.635 Assuming
B—the cost of accident avoidance—is less than PL, the defendant will be liable for
failure to avoid the accident under either negligence or strict liability.636 Because the
most desirable option for the defendant to avoid legal liability is to take due care, due
care is induced.637 In contrast, where B is greater than PL, the defendant will not be
liable for failure to avoid the accident under negligence but nonetheless will be liable
under strict liability. By definition, at any level of care greater than the level of due
care, the cost of the marginal unit of care to the defendant is greater than the expected
reduction in his liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.638 Similarly, if the defendant takes
the care below the level of due care, another unit of care will cost him less than the
reduction in his expected cost of liability does.639 Accordingly, the defendant’s net
income is greater at the level of due care than at any other level of care, and he will
choose due care even if he is held strictly liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.640 Indeed,
there are situations where the defendant’s expected cost of liability is less than the
cost of accident avoidance, and under such circumstances the defendant is better off
not taking any precaution.641 The bottom line is that strict liability will not induce a
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higher level of care than the care level induced by negligence.642

2) Effect on Activity-level
Many legal analysts think that strict liability invokes greater accident avoidance
by encouraging an individual to reduce the level of an activity rather than by simply
inducing more care.643 Judge Posner specifically addressed this point in Indiana
Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.644 In short, Judge Posner argued that strict
liability is superior to negligence because it induces both due care and changes in
activity level, whereas negligence could only induce due care.645 Where the accident
cannot be prevented by taking care, but can be avoided by 1) shifting the activity in
which the accident occurs to another location where the risk or harm of an accident will
be less, or 2) reducing the scale of the activity in order to minimize the number of
accidents, the case is strong for strict liability.646
Indeed, changes in activity level bring about accident avoidance. However, an
issue arises as to whether legal liability should be predicated upon an individual’s
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activity-level decisions. If strict liability’s avoidance mechanism works on the
premise that, under this doctrine, an individual has an incentive to abandon or to
reduce the frequency of an activity, legal liability, in effect, is predicated on the
individual’s decisions to conduct the activity—the activity-level decisions—rather
than on whether the individual did something wrong in conducting the activity.647
From the standpoint of freedom of activity, legal liability should not be imposed on
the activity-level decisions because society does not expect or require an individual to
evaluate such decisions, especially those about how frequently an activity should be
undertaken.648 This argument is particularly effective against the doctrine of strict
liability because strict liability imposes liability on both those who make reasonable
activity-based decisions and those who make unreasonable ones. 649 If legal liability
needs to be placed on activity-level decisions to prevent abuse of freedom of action, it
should be placed solely on unreasonable activity-based decisions because it is unjust
to impose liability on the exercise of personal freedom that is reasonably
undertaken.650
When the reasonableness of activity-level decisions comes into play, the calculus
of fault is relevant to the imposition of liability and the issue can easily be identified
647
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and addressed under negligence.651 For example, when the value of an activity is so
low and the risks of the activity so high that the activity ought to be forgone, the
decision to engage in such activity is unreasonable.652 As such, the existence of
reasonable and safe alternatives for uprooting a tree makes a person’s decision to get
rid of it by blast unreasonable. 653 Furthermore, the inquiry into activity-level
decisions (i.e. about method, time, or location) is the same as the inquiry into
reasonable care, for both ask what the defendant could have done differently and what
impact any different decisions on the defendant’s part would have had on the
victim.654 In fact, courts often use rule-based negligence (e.g. statutory negligence per
se, customs, or judge-made rules about reasonableness of activity-level decisions) to
regulate activity levels.655 Comment a. on Section 297 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts illustrates this point with the following text.656
The act of driving a car along a well-paved road is commonly regarded as not
dangerous in itself, although the road is bordered by ditches, trees, or telegraph
poles. Driving along such a road may be made dangerous if the driver does not
look where he is going, if he drives at too high rate of speed, if he is a beginner
who does not know how to control the car, if the car has a defective brake, or if he
fails to sound his horn before coming to intersecting roads. On the other hand,
there are many mountain roads which may properly be regarded as dangerous no
matter how careful and skillful the driver may be and no matter how perfect his car,
651
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or which at the least are dangerous unless unusual care is exercised by an
unusually skillful driver, with a car in perfect condition. A reasonable man would
recognize that there is an inescapable risk in driving down a narrow and illkept
mountain road, winding along precipices unguarded by walls or railings,
particularly if rain, snow, or ice has rendered the road slippery. The mere use of
such a route under the circumstances described may be negligent unless the utility
of the route is very great.
Thus, courts are able to entertain unreasonable (e.g. extraordinarily high risk)
activity-level claims,657 whereas commentators often underestimate the capacity of
negligence by defining it only in terms of care and excluding from it any possibility of
activity-level consideration.658 When only unreasonable activity-level decisions are
the targets of the legal system and negligence is able to address the reasonableness of
activity-level decisions, the argument for strict liability is untenable.659

C. Fairness: The Benefit Theory

In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,660 plaintiffs brought strict products
liability actions against manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products for injuries
resulting from their exposure to asbestos for varying periods of time.661 In holding that
product manufacturers or distributors are strictly liable for failure to warn even if the
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risks are unknowable at the time of manufacture or distribution, the court reasoned
that:662
One of the most important arguments … for imposing strict liability is that the
manufacturers and distributors of defective products can best allocate the costs of
the injuries resulting from it. The premise is that the price of a product should
reflect all of its costs, including the cost of injuries caused by the product. This can
best be accomplished by imposing liability on the manufacturer and distributors.
Those persons can insure against liability and incorporate the cost of the insurance
in the price of the product. In this way, the costs of the product will be borne by
those who profit from it: the manufacturers and distributors who profit from its sale
and the buyers who profit from its use. It should be a cost of doing business that in
the course of doing that business an unreasonable risk was created.
According to this rationale, anyone who benefits from engaging in an activity should
rightly bear the costs associated with that activity.663 However, benefit theory cannot
justify the selective application of strict liability to limited cases (like product
cases).664 Particularly, benefit theory has also been used to justify the imposition of
“negligence liability.” For example, a driver benefits from the activity of driving
because driving brings about convenience to him. However, the liability of a driver in
an automobile accident rests on principles of negligence rather than strict liability. 665
Significantly, even where the cases involve financial gains to the actors, most of the
time the actors are subject to negligence liability rather than strict liability—for

662

Id. at 547.
See supra note 79 at 281.
664
Fairness fails to demonstrate why product cases are so special as to be singled out of other personal
injury cases. A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, supra note 25 at 647-48.
665
See supra 71.
151
663

instance, innkeepers are liable in negligence for failure to protect their guests from
unreasonable risks of harm.666 Finally, benefit theory fails to explain why enterprises
should be held strictly liable to their customers, who are both beneficiaries and
potential victims of enterprise activity.667

D. Loss Spreading Effects

The last policy justification for strict liability is that this doctrine broadly spreads
the risk of loss.668 Again, Justice Traynor addressed this point in his concurring
opinion for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. by providing that:669
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business.
Loss spreading, through manufacturers of products or large enterprises, may be
viewed as little more than a form of judicially mandated liability insurance.670 By
imposing strict liability on product manufacturers or large enterprises, the tort system
properly shifts losses from innocent victims to those who are better able to distribute
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losses among society through pricing mechanisms.671
Loss spreading policy may have provided the most powerful argument for the
doctrine of strict liability, especially for its applicability to product cases. However,
two issues arise as to 1) what the primary function of tort law is; and 2) whether loss
spreading should be the paramount policy for the imposition of strict liability. 672
Because the 1960s strict products liability revolution originated from the
accumulative effect of previous legal reforms, 673 it is helpful to understand the
historical background before the year 1960.
Health insurance was not widely available in the United States until the 1950s.674
Before then, the choice for most consumers who purchased products was between
seller-provided tort insurance and little or no insurance. 675 During this period,
consumer expectations supported the insurance rationale for tort liability. 676 Accident
injuries were often financially ruinous for individuals in this era, thus making it
doubtful whether consumers actually preferred to be uninsured or underinsured.677
Moreover, while product sellers were not offering guaranteed compensation for
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injuries caused by non-defective products, ordinary consumers presumably preferred
to have this insurance.678 As a result, consumer expectations justified the imposition
of legal liability so that the sellers would be forced to provide insurance or tort
compensation for injuries caused by non-defective products.679 Consistently with this
rationale, tort commentators in the first half of the twentieth century suggested that
tort compensation be justified as a mode of insurance.680
Accordingly, implicit in loss spreading policy is the belief that the primary
function of torts is compensation.681 However, as this Dissertation has consistently
argued, the primary function of tort law is accident deterrence rather than
compensation.

682

First,

the

tort

system

is

an

expensive—and

generally

unsuitable—mode of social insurance, since it entails high administrative costs and
litigation costs.683 Second, in the contemporary world, market insurance is readily
accessible and both accident and liability insurance are available to prospective
victims of accidents and injurers alike.684 If people who want insurance and are
willing to pay for it can obtain insurance in the insurance market or some informal
substitute, there is no reason to use the tort system to provide insurance.685 In other
words, the ability of individuals to purchase insurance that will provide them with
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protection (should an accident occur) makes the compensation function of tort law
less essential.686
Even if insurance becomes the primary concern of tort law, several problems
suggest insurance might not function well in the form of torts. As was stated by Judge
Posner, if the cost of insuring was lower for the defendant than for the plaintiff, there
is a ground to prefer strict liability.687 Significantly, under negligence the consumers
could insure themselves against uncompensated accident injuries, thus distributing
accident costs among customers of commercial insurance carriers.688 On the other
hand, under strict liability the manufacturers would pass on the losses to a group of
consumers through pricing mechanisms.689 However, because it is uncertain whether
the defendant-manufacturers are the lower cost insurers than the plaintiff-consumers,
there are no strong reasons to believe that strict liability is a superior rule to achieve
loss spreading.690
Even though manufacturers indeed are more efficient insurers, another issue
arises as to insurability. As was argued by Professor James Henderson, for any
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insurance system to be viable, the risks insured against must be ascertainable and
quantifiable

ahead

of

time.

691

For

example,

the

prices

of

goods—the

premiums—should proportionally reflect the contributions of the insureds to the
relevant risk pools by classifying the risks involved.692 However, since the premiums
charged are uniform across insureds under strict liability without adequate
classification, the insurance pools will disproportionally attract high-risk insureds,
thereby threatening the viability of the pools.693 Additionally, when strict liability
requires enterprises to function as insurers, it must be able to prevent moral hazard.694
For example, the manufacturer’s liability may be limited to the defect presented at the
original time of distribution, or the enterprises are not held liable for harm to the
victims when victims deliberately place themselves at risk. 695 However, such a
condition is difficult for strict liability to satisfy. 696 Even if defenses such as
contributory negligence, product misuse, or product modification are available to
product manufacturers (who are subject to strict liability), such defenses could never
adequately accommodate the variety of post-distribution product uses and modes of
consumption that would remarkably affect an enterprise’s exposure to liability.697
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Finally, loss spreading cannot justify the selective application of strict liability to
limited cases.698 If it is desirable that tort law distributes losses widely, strict liability
should also spread the losses from other accidents currently governed by
negligence—for example, automobile accidents.699 Perhaps a more efficient approach
is to incorporate in the tort system a mechanism of mandatory insurance 700 or
completely replace the tort system with a more comprehensive no-fault accident
insurance scheme.701 In summary, this Dissertation argues that the primary function
of tort law is accident avoidance and that loss spreading should not be the paramount
policy of tort law to justify the choice of strict liability over negligence.

4.6 Afterwards—The New Role of Strict Liability

A. The Net Distinction Between Strict Liability and Negligence

With several justifications for strict liability undermined, the remaining issue
concerns whether there are other reasons to justify this doctrine. From the plaintiff’s
perspective, under strict liability he need not prove the defendant’s negligence
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because strict liability holds a person liable regardless of the person’s fault.702 In other
words, a major distinction between strict liability and negligence is that strict liability
improves the plaintiff’s position by no longer requiring that the right to compensation
depends on the plaintiff’s proof of the defendant's negligent conduct. 703 However, the
plaintiff encounters another difficulty in satisfying his burden of proof in an action
grounded under strict liability. For example, in a strict products liability action the
plaintiff has to prove the defect of the product and such a task is almost equal in
difficulty to the proof of negligence.704
Similarly, intermediate liability, though grounded under negligence, shifts the
burden of proof in relation to negligence to the defendant. 705 From the plaintiff’s
standpoint, he also need not prove any negligent conduct on the defendant’s part.
Accordingly, this Dissertation argues that the plaintiff’s relief in proof of fault does
not provide tort law with a strong reason to switch to a strict liability regime, since
shifting the burden of proof related to negligence could accomplish the task.706
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B. The Alternative Policy Consideration of Strict Liability

Another distinction between strict liability and negligence is that the former
ensures the plaintiff’s recovery.707 In this regard, an alternative justification for strict
liability may possibly lie on the defendant’s financial capacity. In Taiwan, equitable
liability is a no-fault variation under negligence principles rather than an independent
liability regime.708 The doctrine of equitable liability gives the court discretion to
force one who has the better financial capacity to compensate the innocent victims for
part or all of the injuries even if he is not liable.709 When applying equitable liability,
the court considers the parties’ financial conditions only.710 Put simply, the only
policy justification for this no-fault doctrine lies on the defendant’s superior capacity,
compared with that of the plaintiff, to afford the costs of harm.711 Thus, strict liability
indeed can be justified upon the “deep pockets” rationale.712
However, because the alternative deep pocket policy alone is insufficient to
justify strict liability as an independent liability regime, 713 this Dissertation argues
that strict liability should be incorporated in the form of equitable liability as a
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fallback variation only. More specifically, this Dissertation does not oppose adopting
any no-fault rule to ensure the plaintiff’s recovery, but rather argues that such a rule
should be absorbed into negligence principles as a secondary variation only, since
compensation is not the paramount consideration of tort law.714

C. Intermediate Liability Tested

So far this Dissertation has demonstrated that strict liability cannot justify itself
to be an independent liability regime.715 To further argue that intermediate liability is
a superior option to strict liability in regulating highly risky activities, this
Dissertation has to examine intermediate liability through the tests for strict liability
mentioned previously. 716 First, intermediate liability induces greater accident
avoidance and reduces administration costs. Under intermediate liability, the
defendant has to bear the costs of proof related to negligence and the increased burden
provides the defendant with additional incentives to avoid litigation costs, either by
preventing accidents through exercising due care or through making reasonable
activity-level decisions, or by settling tort claims out of court. On the other hand, such
incentives will almost be the same under either negligence or strict liability, for the
defendant does not bear the costs of proof in relation to negligence under either
714
715
716
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liability regime.717
Second, intermediate liability is fairer because 1) it places the burden of proof in
relation to negligence on those who have superior knowledge and ability to prevent
accidents and 2) it works under a fault-based regime that imposes liability only when
the defendant fails to take cost-justified precautions. Accordingly, although Taiwanese
commentators consider strict liability a huge step of progress in the legal system,718
this Dissertation argues that the imposition of intermediate liability is sufficient to
afford greater protection to innocent victims.
Finally, under intermediate liability, loss spreading is not the paramount policy
of tort law and equitable no-fault liability comes into play as a fallback measure
only.719 Specifically, even if the defendant could escape liability by proving that he
was free from negligence, equitable liability authorizes the court to require one who
has the better financial capacity to compensate the innocent victims in whole or in part,
thus ensuring the plaintiff’s recovery. 720 Therefore, the doctrine of intermediate
liability is a superior option to strict liability in regulating highly risky activities.
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Chapter Five:

Proposed Revisions and Collateral Issues

Synopsis



Several rules currently governed by strict liability should be modified into
intermediate liability rules.




Pure economic loss is not recoverable under risk liability.
Defenses available to negligence are all available to risk liability.




No cap on amount of compensation is necessary for risk liability.
A regular two-year statute of limitation is applicable to risk liability.
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5.1 Overview
As of this point, this Dissertation has made the following seven averments in
response to the traditional policy justifications for strict liability, demonstrating its
preference for intermediate liability:


Traditional strict liability without any form of contributory negligence is
unjustifiable.721



Either form of contributory negligence not only cripples the effect of
traditional strict liability but also turns modern strict liability into a
negligence-like doctrine.722



There is no compelling evidence suggesting that strict liability invokes
greater accident avoidance.723





Fairness cannot justify the imposition of strict liability.724
Loss spreading is not the paramount policy of tort law.725
Strict liability should be reduced to a fallback variation under negligence
principles.726



Intermediate liability, though also a variation under negligence principles,727
is superior to strict liability in regulating highly risky activities.728

In this chapter, this Dissertation specifically addresses how current strict liability rules
should be revised. Because this Dissertation presumes that the current strict liability
rules reflect the legislature’s intent that these specific types of accident call for special
responsibility, choosing intermediate liability rather than regular negligence should be
preferable to these areas of law.
721
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5.2 Proposed Revisions and Their Applications to Real Accidents

A. Argument for Preserving Dangerous Activities Intermediate Liability

Under Article 191-3 of the Civil Code, a person’s liability in negligence is
presumed if the nature of the work or activity performed, or the implements or manner
used in performing the work or activity, is dangerous. 729 To escape liability, the
defendant has to prove that he exercised reasonable care to prevent the injury to the
victim.730 Consequently, Article 191-3 is an intermediate liability rule under which the
defendant bears the burden of proof in relation to negligence. Although the majority of
commentators suggested that this rule be changed into a strict liability rule, 731 this
Dissertation argues that the rule is proper in adopting the doctrine of intermediate
liability and that Taiwanese legislature need not revise it.
However, an issue arises as to the scope of Article 191-3. The liability under
Article 191-3 is predicated upon whether the work or activity, or the implements or
manner used, is dangerous. Yet danger is everywhere. Accordingly, this rule fails to
provide clear guidance with regard to what degree of danger would call for special
responsibility under this rule. To establish a proper guideline for applying Article 191-3,
this Dissertation argues that the reasonableness test under Section 520 of the
729
730
731
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Restatement (Second) of Torts is instrumental, as Article 191-3 is also a fault-based rule.
Consistently with this proposition, the rule shall apply only when 1) the work or activity
is unusual, excessive, bizarre, and non-natural, 732 or 2) the value of the work or
activity, or benefit of using the implements or manner in performing the work or
activity, is too low and the risk of harm too high.733 In other words, Article 191-3 shall
only apply to the abnormally dangerous work or activity or to the situation where the
implements or manner used in performing the work or activity is abnormally
dangerous.734
A more complicated issue concerns the relationship between Article 191-3 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code. While Article 191-3 applies whenever the work or
activity performed, or the implements or manner used, is abnormally dangerous,
Article 191 applies where the victim’s injury is caused by a building or work piece on
privately owned land.735 The two rules may overlap where the cases involve the storage
of extremely dangerous materials on a privately owned land, such as the storage of
gasoline or chemicals. 736 However, this Dissertation argues that the two rules are
distinguishable. Because liability under Article 191-3 is predicated upon whether the
nature of the work or activity, or the implements or manner used, is abnormally
732
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dangerous,737 the rule shall be prioritized in cases involving abnormally dangerous
activities even though the construction or maintenance of buildings or work pieces is
also at issue. In contrast, Article 191 shall apply where the construction or maintenance
of buildings or work pieces has nothing to do with abnormally dangerous activities.738
It is true that before Article 191-3 was enacted in 1999, courts often applied Article 191
where the construction or maintenance of buildings or work pieces also involved
abnormally dangerous activities.739 However, after the enactment of Article 191-3, the
distinction between the two rules should rightly be made.
Thus, in the Gasoline Leaks Case,740 because the storage of gasoline is an unusual,
excessive, bizarre, and non-natural activity and because the risk of harm is great when
a petroleum pipeline explodes, Article 191-3 shall apply.741 Under Article 191-3, C
Petroleum is presumed negligent and has to prove that it exercised reasonable care in
the maintenance of petroleum pipelines that transmitted the gasoline onto W‘s tanker.
On the other hand, in the Electricity Overload Case,742 because the fire resulted from
the long-term usage of electricity at B’s office, which had nothing to do with
abnormally dangerous activities but rather concerned the general danger inherent in
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the improper maintenance of the wiring system of a building, Article 191 shall apply.
Under Article 191, B bears the burden to prove that he exercised reasonable care in
maintaining the wiring system of the building to rebut the presumption of negligence.

B. Proposed Revisions & Comparisons, Notes, and Illustrations

In the following text, this Dissertation specifically demonstrates how the strict
liability rules mentioned in Chapter Two743 could be modified into intermediate
liability rules and compares the suggested revisions with the current statutes.

1) Civil Aviation Act

a. Article 89: Liability for Aircraft Accident

743

Current Version

Suggested Revision

Where casualties or damage to property
occur as a result of aircraft accident, the
owner of the aircraft shall be liable for
compensation regardless of whether
such accident is due to willful action or

Where casualties or damage to property
occur as a result of aircraft accident, the
owner of the aircraft shall be liable for
compensation, regardless of whether
such accident is due to willful action or

negligence. Such an owner of the
aircraft shall also be liable for damage
caused by force majeure. The same also
applies to damage caused by falling or
dropping of objects from the aircraft.

negligence. Such an owner of the
aircraft shall also be liable for damage
caused by force majeure. except where
he has exercised reasonable care to
prevent the injury. The same also applies
to damage caused by falling or the
dropping of objects from the aircraft.

See supra 58-67.
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i. Notes
The current rule imposes absolute liability on the owner of an aircraft. 744 To
change the rule into intermediate liability, this Dissertation argues that exercise of
reasonable care should be a valid defense for the defendant to establish. Moreover, the
text “regardless of whether such accident is due to willful action or negligence” and
“also be liable for damage caused by force majeure” should be deleted, since under
intermediate liability the defendant is liable only if he was at fault for the plaintiff’s
injuries.
ii. Application of the Rule
In the C-Air Flight 711 Incident,745 the accident resulted from negligent repairing;
the repair crews failed to replace the damaged plate but rather covered the damaged
area with another plate the same size as the area. Hence, under the proposed rule C-Air
could hardly prove that it exercised reasonable care in preventing the incidents, because
it failed to conduct proper supervision of the performance of its repair crews’ duties.
Moreover, even if C-Air could escape liability under the proposed Article 89 of Civil
Aviation Act by proving that it was not negligent in supervision, it may still be held
liable under the theory of equitable liability because Article 89 of the Civil Aviation Act
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does not preempt causes of action under the Civil Code.746
On the other hand, in the T-Air Flight 555 Incident,747 T-Air could escape liability
by proving that it exercised reasonable care to prevent the injury but nonetheless could
not avoid the accident because of the extreme weather conditions. However, T-Air
would have a difficult time rebutting the presumption of negligence if the court finds
that T-Air was negligent in failing to cancel the flight when facing an approaching
typhoon and that T-Air could have foreseen that an accident would occur in such
extreme weather conditions; that said, the extreme weather conditions were a
foreseeable act of God. Similarly, even if T-Air escapes liability by rebutting its
negligence under the proposed Article 89 of Civil Aviation Act, it could still be held
liable under the theory of equitable liability.748
By so demonstrating, this Dissertation argues that 1) the imposition of
intermediate liability in civil aviation incidents, accompanied by equitable liability as a
fallback solution under the Civil Code, does not leave passengers with inferior
protection compared with that offered by strict liability, and that 2) the Taiwanese legal
system lacks compelling reasons to switch to strict liability for resolution.

746
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b. Article 91: Liability for Accidental Harms
Current Version

Suggested Revision

The aircraft operator shall be liable for
accidental death or injury of passengers
in the aircraft or while embarking or
disembarking the aircraft. But if such
death or injury is attributed to the
passenger’s fault, such liability may be

The aircraft operator shall be liable for
accidental death or injury of passengers
in the aircraft or while embarking or
disembarking the aircraft, except where
he has exercised reasonable care to
prevent the injury. But if If such death or

exonerated or reduced.
The aircraft operator shall be liable for
causing damage to passengers because
of flight delay, provided that the aircraft
operator can prove the delay is caused

injury is attributed to the passenger’s
fault, such liability may be exonerated
or reduced.
The aircraft operator shall be liable for
causing damage to passengers because

by force majeure. The liability shall be
limited to the necessary extra expense
incurred to the passengers through the
flight delay.

of flight delay, provided that the aircraft
operator can prove the delay is caused
by force majeure. The liability shall be
limited to the necessary extra expense
incurred to the passengers through the
flight delay.

i. Notes
The current rule imposes strict liability on the aircraft operator. To change the rule
into intermediate liability, the Dissertation suggests that the defendant’s exercise of
reasonable care be a valid defense. As for the aircraft operator’s liability for delay under
the second paragraph of this rule, it is a question of breach of contractual duty and is
beyond the scope of this Dissertation.749

749

More specifically, because the second paragraph of Article 91 of the C IVIL AVIATION ACT uses
similar language to Article 654 of the CIVIL CODE, it is a rule regulating liabilities arising out of breach
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ii. Application of the Rule
The first paragraph of the proposed Article 91 of the Civil Aviation Act shall apply
when passengers suffer injuries or death in the aircraft or while embarking or
disembarking the aircraft, as was the situation in Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc.750

2) Article 18 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law: Liability for Nuclear
Disaster
Current Version

Suggested Revision

The operator of a nuclear installation
shall, in accordance with this Law, be
liable for nuclear damages arising from
the occurrence or expansion of a nuclear
incident regardless of whether it is

The operator of a nuclear installation
shall, in accordance with this Law, be
liable for nuclear damages arising from
the occurrence or expansion of a nuclear
incident regardless of whether it is

caused intentionally or through
negligence, except when the nuclear
incident is caused directly by
international armed conflicts, hostilities,
domestic rebellion, or grave natural
calamity.

caused intentionally or through
negligence, except where the operator
has exercised reasonable care to
prevent the injury or when the nuclear
incident is caused directly by
international armed conflicts, hostilities,
domestic rebellion, or grave natural
calamity.
If compensation cannot be obtained
according to the provision of the
preceding paragraph, the court may, on
the application of the injured person,
take the financial conditions of the
operator and the injured person into
consideration, and order the operator to
compensate for a part or the whole of

of contract concerning carriage of passengers. See Liu Cheuntang, Min Fa Jai Bian Ko Lun–Chung
(Civil Code: Kinds of Obligations–vol. 2) 479 and 481-82 Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2007.
750
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the injury.

a. Notes
The current rule imposes liability on the operator of a nuclear facility regardless of
fault, and allows the defendant to offer certain defenses. Under this Dissertation’s
view, this rule should be modified into an intermediate liability rule, and the text
“regardless of whether it is caused intentionally or through negligence” should be
deleted. Additionally, since risk of harm from nuclear disaster is enormous and often
financially ruinous for innocent victims, the proposed second paragraph directly
incorporates equitable liability into this rule and authorizes the court to force the
defendant to compensate for a part or the whole of the injury even though the defendant
is not liable.
b. Application of the Rule: Nuclear Facility Incident
In the Nuclear-facility Disaster, 751 if the disaster was foreseeable and the
defendant was negligent in maintaining the facility, the defendant would have a
difficult time rebutting the presumption of its negligence. For example, it might be
foreseeable that the power supply facilities would be damaged should a tsunami hit the
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See supra 32.
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power plant, thereby making it foreseeable that the emergency-cooling system would
fail and the fuel rods would melt as a result. By contrast, if the defendant proves that it
exercised reasonable care in preventing the injury, it could escape liability under the
proposed first paragraph of Article 18 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law.
However, under the proposed second paragraph, the court has discretion to impose
equitable liability and require the defendant to compensate the victims in whole or in
part. As with civil aviation incidents, nuclear-facility disasters do not offer compelling
reasons for the Taiwanese legal system to switch to strict liability for resolution.

3) Article 46 in the Mass Rapid Transit Act: Liability for MRT Accident

Current Version

Suggested Revision

1. The operation organization of a mass
rapid transit system shall be responsible
for personal death or injury of
passengers, and damage or loss caused
by trains or other accidents.

1. The operation organization of a mass
rapid transit system shall be responsible
for personal death or injury of
passengers, and damage or loss caused
by trains or other accidents, except

2. The operation organization of a mass
rapid transit system shall pay for, at its
discretion, consolation or medical aid
subsidy for death or injury victims, even
when the operation organization is not
responsible for the train accident
referred to the preceding paragraph.
However, the above mentioned
circumstance does not apply if the

where it has exercised reasonable care
to prevent the injury.
2. The operation organization of a mass
rapid transit system shall pay for, at its
discretion, consolation or medical aid
subsidy for death or injury victims, even
when the operation organization is not
responsible liable in negligence for the
train accident referred to in the
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accident is caused by the victim
intentionally.
3. The regulations for the payment for
consolation and medical aid subsidy
referred to the preceding paragraph shall
be prescribed by the central competent
authority.

preceding paragraph. However, the
above mentioned circumstance does not
apply if the accident is caused by the
victim intentionally.
3. The regulations for the payment for
consolation and medical aid subsidy
referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall be prescribed by the central
competent authority.

a. Notes
The first paragraph is modified to permit the defendant to escape liability provided
that the defendant establishes their exercise of reasonable care in accident avoidance.
The revised text “liable in negligence” in the proposed second paragraph serves to
emphasize that intermediate liability is a variation under negligence principles.
b. Application of the Rule
In the MRT Station Case,752 because Article 46 of the Mass Rapid Transit Act
applies in cases of injuries from trains or other rail accidents such as derailments,753 the
plaintiff would not recover under the rule. Rather, the plaintiff might rely on causes of
action grounded under the Civil Code. For example, the first paragraph of Article 41 of
the Mass Rapid Transit Act provides that:754
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See supra 29-30.
See supra 62.
Article 41 of the MASS RAPID TRANSIT ACT.
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The operation organization of a mass rapid transit system shall properly manage
and maintain the carriages, route, depot and station facilities, and shall prepare
emergency escape equipments and facilities necessary for passengers’ safety. The
inspection and maintenance of carriages and devices must be implemented strictly
in compliance with regulations.
The rule is a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others,755 and the plaintiff
could bring a suit under the second paragraph of Article 184 of the Civil Code against
the MRT operator for injuries resulting from violation of the first paragraph of Article
41 of the Mass Rapid Transit Act.756

4) Article 64 of the Highway Act: Liability for Common Carrier

755
756
757

Current Version

Suggested Revision

1) In the case of traffic accidents causing
injury or death to passengers or other
people, or damage or loss to money or
property, automobile or trolley
transportation providers shall be liable
for the damage and compensate for it.
However, the providers are not liable to

1) In the case of traffic accidents causing
injury or death to passengers or other
people, or damage or loss to money or
property, automobile or trolley
transportation providers shall be liable
for the damage and compensate for it.
However, the providers are not liable to

pay damage compensation if it can be
proven that the accident was due to force
majeure or fault of the shipper or
recipient of carried goods.
2) (Paragraph Omitted)757
3) (Paragraph Omitted)

pay damage compensation if it can be
proven that the transportation providers
have exercised reasonable care to
prevent the injury or the accident was
due to force majeure or fault of the
shipper or recipient of carried goods.
2) (Paragraph Omitted)

See supra note 4 at 688.
See supra 37.
See supra 62 for text of the omitted paragraphs which are related to the ceiling on liability.
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3) (Paragraph Omitted)

a. Notes
Under the proposed first paragraph, the defendant transportation provider could
escape liability by proving that it exercised reasonable care to prevent traffic accidents.
By so changing, the proposed rule is an intermediate liability rule rather than a strict
liability rule.
b. Application of the Rule
In the Freight Transportation Case,758 because the damage was not incurred in a
traffic accident, Article 64 of the Highway Act shall not apply. Rather, the plaintiff shall
pursue an action grounded under Article 184 and Article 188 of the Civil Code.759 In
other words, the plaintiff has to bring an action under the Civil Code against the
employee-driver and W Express. On the other hand, in the Carriage of Passenger
Case,760 because P suffered injuries as a result of a traffic accident occurring at a
highway, Article 64 of the Highway Act shall apply.761 The current version is a strict
liability rule, but this Dissertation suggests that it be modified into an intermediate
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See supra 29.
See also: supra note 118.
See supra 29.
See also: supra note 119.
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liability rule. Under the proposed rule, S Bus Company could escape liability by
proving that it exercised reasonable care to prevent P’s injuries. Moreover, it could
escape liability by proving that its driver was not negligent at the time of the accident
and that the accident was caused totally by the fault of C, the third party. Given the
proposed changes, the court in the Carriage of Passenger Case may reach a fairer result
than that derived from applying the principle of strict liability.

5) Article 7 in Consumer Protection Law: Liability for Products

Current Version

Suggested Revision

Traders engaging in designing,
producing or manufacturing of goods or
in the provisions of services, shall
ensure that goods or services provided
meet and comply with the contemporary
technical and professional standards
with reasonably expected safety
requirements when placing the goods

Traders engaging in the designing,
producing or manufacturing of goods or
in the provisions of services, shall
ensure that goods or services provided
meet and comply with the contemporary
technical and professional standards
with reasonably expected safety
requirements when placing the goods

into the stream of commerce, or at the
time rendering services.
All safety warnings and emergency
response manuals shall be marked or
labeled conspicuously on the goods or
services provided which may cause
harm to the lives, bodies, health or
properties of consumers.
Traders shall be jointly and severally

into the stream of commerce, or at the
time rendering services.
All safety warnings and emergency
response manuals shall be marked or
labeled conspicuously on the goods or
services provided which may cause
harm to the lives, bodies, health or
properties of consumers.
Traders shall be jointly and severally

liable in violating the foregoing

liable in violating the foregoing
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paragraphs and thereby causing injury
or damage to consumers or third parties,
provided that if traders can prove that
they have not been negligent, the court
may reduce damages.

paragraphs and thereby causing injury
or damage to consumers or third parties,
provided that if except where traders can
prove that they have not been negligent,
the court may reduce damages.

a. Notes
The current rule imposes strict liability on a product manufacturer. However,
according to the third paragraph of Article 7 in Consumer Protection Law, the court
may reduce the manufacturer’s liability if the latter proved that it exercised reasonable
care. Accordingly, the current rule is not a pure strict liability rule under which the
defendant shall pay the victim full compensation regardless of fault. 762 Nevertheless,
under this Dissertation’s view, the third paragraph of Article 7 should be modified to
allow the manufacturer to escape liability if it established that it is not negligent. By
so changing, the manufacture’s liability belongs to a fault-based regime.
Moreover, this Dissertation argues that a revision toward intermediate liability
will not affect the degree of protection enjoyed by product consumers. First, because
the product manufacturer holds itself out as a specialist in producing a superior
product and induces a special trust held by consumers, it is subject to a heightened
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See also: Hsu, Hui-Feng, The Economic Analysis on Tort Liability–Automobile Accident 88-89
Master’s thesis, Indiana University School of Law–Bloomington (May 2001).
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duty of care rather than that of ordinary reasonableness.763 In addition, according to
Article 7-1 of this Law,764
Trader shall bear the burden of proof where he claims that the goods or services
provided meet and comply with the contemporary technical and professional
standards of reasonably expected safety requirements when placing the goods into
the stream of commerce, or at the time rendering services.
Goods or services cannot be considered non-compliance [sic] with the safety
requirements described in the previous paragraph for the sole reason that safer
goods or services are subsequently available.
The issue under Article 7-1 of this Law is whether the contemporary technical and
professional standards at the time of distribution of a product could have foreseen the
risk of harm and avoided the injuries to consumers. If the answer is affirmative, a
product is considered defective when it fails to meet and comply with the
contemporary technical and professional standards of reasonably expected safety
requirements. Under the American products liability law, the issue concerning the
relationship between accident avoidance and the technology available at the time of
product distribution is related to the concept of “state of the art.”765 Different from the
American products liability law under which “state of the art” is a defense, Article 7
of the Consumer Protection Law turns the concept of “state of the art” into one of the
elements of defectiveness, as defectiveness under Article 7 of this Law is defined as
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Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 Wayne L. Rev.
1217, 1282 (1992).
764
Article 7-1 of the CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW.
765
See supra note 574 at 309-12.
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failure to meet or comply with the contemporary technical and professional standards
with reasonably expected safety requirements when placing the goods into the stream
of commerce.766 Because “state of the art” is actually a test about fault,767 in effect,
Article 7 of this Law considers the manufacturer’s liability under a fault-based standard.
Therefore, modifying Article 7 of this Law into an intermediate liability rule will not
seriously affect the degree of protection offered to product consumers.
b. Application of the Rule
Pursuant to Article 7 and Article 7-1 of the Consumer Protection Law, the
plaintiff has to prove that:768 1) there is a commercial product; 769 2) there is a
business entity which engages in the designing, producing, or manufacturing of goods;
3) the business entity distributed the product into the market; 4) the plaintiff suffered
injuries while engaging in the reasonably anticipated use of the product;770 and 5)
there is adequate causation establishing the link between the plaintiff’s injuries and
the product defect. In contrast, the manufacturer is subject to strict liability and has to

766
767
768
769
770

See supra note 4 at 705.
A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, supra note 25 at 663.
See supra note 4 at 709.
See also: Article 4 of the ENFORCEMENT RULES OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW.
Article 5 of the ENFORCEMENT RULES OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW provides that:
“Goods or services provided meet and comply with the contemporary technical and professional
standards with reasonably expected safety requirements” as referred in Paragraph 1, Article 7 of
the Law shall be considered based on the following matters:
1. The information labels on the goods or services;
2. The reasonably expected use or acceptance of the goods or services; and
3. The point of time when placing the goods or rendering the services into the stream of
commerce.
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satisfy its burden of proving that the product was not defective in order to escape its
liability.771
With the proposed revision to the third paragraph of Article 7 of the Consumer
Protection Law applied, a product manufacturer is no longer strictly liable to
consumers but rather has an additional way of escaping its liability—by rebutting the
presumption of its negligence—whereas the five elements a plaintiff needs to prove
remain unchanged. Significantly, in the Poisonous Milk Case,772 Mead Johnson could
escape liability by proving that the powered milk was not defective. Even if the milk
was defective, under the proposed rule Mead Johnson could rebut its negligence if it
established that it exercised reasonable care in production and quality control
procedures. Similarly, in the Exploding Bottle Case,773 C Company could escape
liability by proving either that the bottle was not defective or that C Company
exercised reasonable care in production and quality control procedures. Thirdly, in the
Defective Ladder Case,774 because the plaintiff’s action is grounded under the theory
of defective design, the manufacturer of the ladder bears the burden of proof in
arguing that the ladder was not negligently designed. Finally, in the Defective Cleaner
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See supra note 27 and supra note 764.
See supra 26.
See supra 26-27.
See supra 27-28.
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Case,775 since the plaintiff sued the defendant P under the theory of failure to warn, P
needs to prove that it exercised reasonable care in providing safety warnings in order
to rebut its liability.

C. Additional Notes on Costs of Reforms

Having suggested several revisions of current strict liability rules, this
Dissertation still leaves a question open regarding whether the costs of the proposed
reforms will yield net social benefits.776 Indeed, all the proposed reforms are not
cost-free.777 More significantly, Article 64 in the 1984 version of Highway Act was
an intermediate liability rule,778 thereby making it more complicated to anticipate that
the legislature would admit its “mistake” in taking this rule toward the realm of strict
liability and restore this rule to its original status. However, although the issue of costs
of institutional changes is beyond the scope of this Dissertation, this Dissertation
believes that the overall suggested revisions are worthwhile because intermediate
liability, a variation under the fault-based liability regime, is better able to reach more
efficient results than strict liability. At minimum, this Dissertation offers a solution to
the scholarly debate over the proper liability standard for Article 191-3 in the Civil
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See supra 28.
See supra note 49 at 319.
Id.
See supra note 4 at 680.
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Code and its relationship with Article 191 of the Civil Code.779 Under the proposed
theory, the current Article 191-3 is proper in preserving its current status as an
intermediate liability rule and Taiwanese legislature need not revise its liability
standard. If the proposed revisions regarding strict liability rules are rejected for the
reason of costs of institutional changes, the proposed solution for preserving the status
of Article 191-3 should be found favorable on the same basis.

5.3 Recovery for Pure Economic Loss

A. The Issue of Pure Economic Loss

Pure economic loss refers to pecuniary loss that does not flow from physical
harm to a victim’s person or property.780 Although no issues of recovery for pure
economic loss arise in intentional torts because the scienter of the tortfeasor satisfies
the requirement of foreseeability of harm to particular victims, recovery for pure
economic loss in accidental harms is more controversial. Professor Wang argues that
pure economic loss is not recoverable in negligence. 781 He relies upon the
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See supra 164 and supra 165-166.
For more on the common law definition of pure economic loss, see Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub.
Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722 (Ind. 2010); Harris v. Suniga, 149 P.3d 224
(Or. App. 2006); and the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM
§2 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2012).
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Wang Tzejian, Min Fa Shiue Shuo Yu Pan Li Yan Jiou Di Ba Tse (Research of Civil Law Theory
and Cases, Volume Eight). 300-01 Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2009.
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interpretations of the first paragraph of Article 184 in the Civil Code. 782 More
particularly, Wang made a distinction between the first part of the rule and the second
part: the first part protects one’s individual rights from harm, whereas the second part
protects one’s interests.783 Defining pure economic loss as the harm to interests rather
than individual rights, Wang argues that pure economic loss is not recoverable as of
right under the first part of first paragraph of Article 184.784 Additionally, he argues
that because pure economic loss can be recovered in contract law (which provides a
more efficient way to protect economic interests), recovery for pure economic loss
under negligence principles is unnecessary.785 Taiwanese courts are divided on the
issue. While some court opinions follow Wang’s approach,786 the majority holds that
pure economic loss is recoverable as of right under Article 184.787
In theory, it is possible to recognize economic loss under the “rights” category of
Article 184. For example, pure economic loss is recoverable, in limited cases, in the
American common law where a professional negligently performs services knowing a
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See supra 37.
See supra note 781.
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Taipei Difang Fayuan 93 Nian Lao Su Zi No. 106 (Lao Su Zi No. 106 by Taiwan Taipei District
Court in 2004).
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Zuigao Fayuan, 91 Nian Tai Shang Zi No. 2096 (Tai Shang Zi No. 2096 by Supreme Court of
Taiwan in 2002); Zuigao Fayuan, 88 Nian Tai Shang Zi No. 1827 (Tai Shang Zi No. 1827 by Supreme
Court of Taiwan in 1999); Taichung Difang Fayuan 93 Nian Su Zi No. 951 (Su Zi No. 951 by Taiwan
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limited group of parties intend to rely on his work (and do, to their detriment).788
Indeed, if parties are in privity of contract, indeterminate liability in tort may devour
the law of contract.789 However, if a plaintiff not in privity suffers pure economic loss,
such as the negligent misrepresentation case mentioned above, imposing a tort
liability may be a better alternative. 790 Under the current approach, a victim’s
recovery for pure economic loss is considered on an all-or-nothing basis grounded
upon the interpretations of Article 184. If the court declines to allow pure economic
loss to be recovered as of right, the result may sometimes be unfair and unjust to the
victims because the magnitude of economic harm to them may sometimes be too large
to absorb.791
The Supreme Court of Taiwan specifically addressed the issue in the Second
Decision of 19th Civil Case Convention of 1988.792 The case involved an employee
who breached his duty and misrepresented the financial status of another. Based on
this representation, his employer made a loan and suffered pure economic loss. The
employer then sued the employee to recover pure economic loss as of right under
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Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP., 668 N.E.2d 1368 (1998).
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974).
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The accountant’s liability for negligent misrepresentation under Article 20 of the SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE ACT of Taiwan is also a tort liability to third parties.
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In arguing against recovery for pure economic loss in accidental harms, Professor Wang takes pure
economic loss suffered through the interruption of electricity for example and suggests that such harm
is usually minor. See supra note 781 at 296.
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Article 184. The decision by the Court implied recovery for pure economic loss is
permitted under the first part of the first paragraph of Article 184, and that pure
economic loss is recoverable under negligence principles.
This Dissertation consents with the Supreme Court’s approach, and further
argues that 1) economic interest is a recognized right under the first part of the first
paragraph of Article 184 and pure economic loss is recoverable as of right;793 and 2)
whether pure economic loss is recoverable under certain circumstances is a matter of
coverage of recovery.
In Taiwan, the primary goal of compensation is to restore the status quo before
the harm to an injured party.794 Article 213 of the Civil Code provides that:
Unless otherwise provided by the act or by the contract, a person who is bound to
make compensation for an injury shall restore the injured party to the status quo
before the injury.
If the restoration of the status quo ante shall be paid in money, interest shall be
added from the time of the injury.
Under the circumstances of the first paragraph, the creditor may claim the
necessary expenses for restoration instead of the restoration.
Therefore, damages beyond restoring the victim to the status quo are possible only
when the law or the contract provides otherwise.795 For tort actions, four methods of
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See also: Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647 (1958).
Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code, supra note 5 at 152-53.
Id. at 152.
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recovery are specifically available.796 None, however, explicitly refer to recovery for
pure economic loss in tort.
Moreover, Article 216 of the Civil Code provides a default rule of coverage by
stating that:
Unless otherwise provided by the act or by the contract, the compensation shall be
limited to the injury actually suffered and the interests which have been lost.
Interests which could have been normally expected are deemed to be the interests
which have been lost, according to the ordinary course of things, the decided
projects, equipment, or other particular circumstances.
This rule adopts the principle of full recovery. The coverage of recovery includes two
spheres.797 First, the tortfeasor must compensate the victim for harm to property or
interests existing at the time of injury. 798 Second, the tortfeasor also must pay for
interests the injured should have received but for the tort. 799 Furthermore, these
expected interests are valued in accordance with the ordinary course of things, the
decided projects, equipment, or other particular circumstances.800
The general principle established by both Articles 213 and 216 is qualified with
“unless otherwise provided by the act or by the contract.” However, none of the rules
in the Tort Chapter explicitly mention recovery for pure economic loss in tort
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Id. at 119-23.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 156.
See the second paragraph of Article 216 of the CIVIL CODE.
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actions.801 As a result, the current state of law in Taiwan is uncertain concerning tort
recovery for pure economic loss. The current rules either fail to clarify whether pure
economic loss is recoverable as of right under Article 184 or fail to stipulate whether
pure economic loss is included within coverage of recovery. Although courts usually
find recovery for pure economic loss available as of right under Article 184,802 they
fail to provide a clear standard. Accordingly, recovery for pure economic loss under
negligence principles is an all-or-nothing result—either it is recoverable in no cases
for negligence or it is recoverable in all kinds of negligence cases. The same concern
also arises in an action under Article 191-3 of the Civil Code and in other risk liability
cases.803

B. The Standard for Recovery

To solve the issue, this Dissertation argues that it is instrumental to refer to the
pure economic loss rule of American common law. 804 Unlike the all-or-nothing
approach in Taiwan, American law considers the pure economic loss rule under a
category-by-category basis. Because relevant causes of action under intermediate
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Tort Chapter covers from Article 184 to Article 198 of the C IVIL CODE.
See supra note 787.
See supra note 4 at 659.
Article 1 of the CIVIL CODE provides that:
If there is no applicable act for a civil case, the case shall be decided according to customs. If there
is no such custom, the case shall be decided according to the jurisprudence.
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liability are those grounded under products liability and public nuisance, 805 the
following discussion will only address recovery for pure economic loss under the two
scenarios. When a person suffers pure economic loss because of a defective product,
parties often are in privity of contract, and contract law or warranty law could
adequately address the issue.806 Despite this, the victim often bases his recovery on
strict products liability rather than breach of contract or warranty claims because he
would not have to prove either privity of contract or be subject to disclaimers.807
Whether pure economic loss is recoverable in a products liability action is an open
question. Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States answered this question in
the negative.808 In East River Steamship,809 charters of four tankers brought suit
against the defendant Delaval for damages suffered because turbines manufactured by
Delaval were negligently designed, manufactured, and installed in their tankers. 810 In
finding no recovery for economic harm, the Court distinguished between contract and
tort remedies.811 When a product injures only itself, the Court reasoned, the victim
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Generally, all offenses one suffers in public nuisance involve interference with the interests of the
community at large—interests that were recognized as rights of the general public entitled to protection.
State v. Lead Indus., Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 444 (R.I. 2008). See also: R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, supra note 457 at 619.
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East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986).
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Id. at 2297.
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Id. at 2302-03.
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could bring suit in contract law for redress.812 In turn, the tort concern with safety is
reduced when an injury is only to the product itself because the users stand to undergo
the loss of the value of products, unsatisfied expectation,813 or increased costs in
using the products.814 Until then, pure economic loss is considered not recoverable in
strict products liability, and Section 21 of the Products Liability Restatement also
adopts the rule from East River Steamship:815
For purposes of the Restatement, harm to persons or property includes economic
loss if caused by harm to (a) the plaintiff’s person; (b) the person of another
when harm to the other interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort
law; or (c) the plaintiff’s property other than the defective product itself.816

On the other hand, when a person suffers pure economic loss because of public
nuisance,817 an action in tort is expected because privity of contract rarely exists
between a victim and a tortfeasor. For example, a company negligently blocks a
bridge and cuts off traffic between islands, thereby causing business interruption in
nearby areas.818 Like in products liability cases, pure economic loss here generally
cannot be recovered unless there has also been physical harm to the plaintiff
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The court held that such harm should be understood as warranty claim rather than as tort. Id. at
2302.
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victims.819 At the same time, it seems unfair to deny damages here because—unlike
product liability cases—the plaintiff here has no way to seek contractual remedies. A
case from the New York Court of Appeals may help to clarify this rule and its policy
concerns. In 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc.,820 a
commercial tower collapsed as a result of the defendant’s negligence and caused
nearby areas to close for at least two weeks.821 The owners of nearby stores brought a
tort action to recover for lost profits arising out of the interruption of their business.822
The court denied recovery, reasoning if the presence of members of public or other
people traveling nearby was fortuitous, any economic loss they suffered would be
unpredictable.823 To avoid indeterminate liability and to avoid unfairness between
geographically similar plaintiffs, the court limited recovery to plaintiffs who suffered
personal injury or property damage. 824 Accordingly, pure economic loss is not
recoverable in products liability because contract law and warranty law governs harm
to the product itself.825 Similarly, pure economic loss is not recoverable in public
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See also: RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM §8
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nuisance cases for fear that the defendant may be subject to indeterminate liability.826
Consistently with this standard, this Dissertation argues that pure economic loss is
irrecoverable in an action grounded under Article 191-3 of the Civil Code or in other
risk liability cases.

5.4 Other Collateral Issues

A. Defenses to Negligence Also Applicable to Intermediate Liability
With risk liability interpreted as the concept of strict liability, an issue arises as to
what the available defenses are in an action grounded under strict risk liability.827
More particularly, the issue concerns whether the legislature needs to stipulate
defenses specifically designed for strict risk liability.828 However, when intermediate
liability steps into the shoes of strict liability, a defendant’s liability is evaluated under
a fault-based standard and all the defenses available to negligence are also available to
risk liability, including any form of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.829
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See supra 190-191.
See supra note 4 at 720.
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In Taiwan, there is no separate concept recognized as “assumption of risk.” Rather, the related issue
is possibly tried under the issue of comparative negligence, since comparative negligence intends to
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the Civil Code, supra note 5 at 158.
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B. Ceilings on Liability Are Not Required for Intermediate Liability

A second issue concerns ceilings on liability when the defendant is subject to
strict risk liability.830 Caps on liability are not essential to strict liability.831 Rather,
the purpose of limitation on liability is to prevent excessive liability from driving out
activities which are highly dangerous but beneficial to society. 832 With strict liability
imposed, the current version of the Civil Aviation Act, 833 Nuclear Damage
Compensation Law,834 and Highway Act835 all adopt caps on the defendant’s liability.
However, when intermediate liability becomes the operative rule of risk liability, this
Dissertation argues that a fault-based standard could sufficiently prevent excessive
liability and the caps in the above-mentioned three statutes should be removed.

C. Extended Statute of Limitation for Nuclear Damage Compensation Law and
Consumer Protection Law

Finally, the current version of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law provides
an extended statute of limitation for actions under this Law. 836 Considering that
product-related accidents bear similar characteristics to nuclear-related incidents in
that both involve a long latency period before injuries manifest,837 the Dissertation
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argues that an extended statute of limitation for products liability actions grounded
under Consumer Protection Law is preferable. For example, the rule could provide
that:838
The claim for the injury arising from products liability shall be extinguished by
prescription, if not exercised within THREE years from the date when the injury
and the person bound to make compensation became known to the injured person.
The same rule shall be applied if ten years have elapsed from the date when the
product was delivered.
As for other accidents involving common carrier’s liability, this Dissertation argues
that unless otherwise specified by a statutory provision,839 a regular two-year statute
of limitation under the first paragraph of Article 197 of Civil Code shall apply.840

836
837
838
839
840

See supra 61-62.
See supra note 4 at 697.
See supra note 59 at 105.
Article 54 of the HIGHWAY ACT.
See also: supra note 4 at 718.
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Conclusion

The propositions of this Dissertation are simple and straightforward: 1) strict
liability is no panacea to accident avoidance; and 2) intermediate liability, as a
variation under negligence principles, is sufficient to protect innocent victims and to
be the operative rule for risk liability. More particularly, this Dissertation regards risk
liability as only a superordinate concept not necessarily equated to the principle of
strict liability but rather waiting for the supplement of a doctrine.841 However, if
Taiwanese legal scholarship would rather insist that risk liability always be equated to
the doctrine of strict liability, 842 then this Dissertation will suggest complete
abandonment of the concept of risk liability.
As had previously been noted by Justice Holmes, people should not be made to
pay for accidents which they could not have avoided.843 In other words, accident loss
should lie where it falls,844 and there should be no liability without fault.845 With
strict liability reduced to a fallback variation under negligence principles—i.e., the
concept of equitable liability—the newly proposed tort liability framework comprises

841
842
843
844
845

See supra 1-2.
See supra note 4.
See supra note 668 at 149.
Id. at 94.
See supra note 74 at 127.
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only intentional torts, negligence, and variations under negligence, as Chart 1
demonstrates in the following.
Chart 1: The Newly Proposed Framework of Taiwanese Tort Liability

Tort Liability

Intentional Torts

Negligence
Intermediate
Liability
Negligence
Variations

Equitable Liability

Given the newly proposed tort liability framework, this Dissertation not only
articulates the proper liability rule—intermediate liability—for Article 191-3, but also
alleviates the rising tension between strict liability and negligence.
Finally, because this Dissertation addresses general policy considerations for the
doctrine of strict liability and proposes reforms to this principle, this Dissertation’s
196

analysis may possibly shed light on legal systems outside of Taiwan, and its
propositions may even be applicable to legal systems other than the Taiwanese legal
system.
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